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This thesis examines whether realistic job previews (RJPs) can be used to reduce
the first-term attrition ofNavy recruits. The methodology consists of a literature review
in which previous RJP studies are examined for their relevance to military accession and
training processes. The military's use of educational screens, trends and costs of first-
term attrition, and labor market theories of turnover are discussed to provide a common
frame of reference within which to view the person-job matching process and its
consequences. In general, the literature suggests that RJPs are effective in reducing
turnover and could result in long-term savings in recruiting and training sailors.
However, there are also costs associated with the use of RJPs. These costs are primarily
short-term, and include funding for development and implementation, as well as the
potential for increasing recruiting costs through lower rates ofjob acceptance.
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A. DEFINING THE ISSUE
A 1979 study of military recruit training attrition (Mobley, Hand, Baker, and
Meglino, 1979) offers the following observations on first-term attrition of enlisted
personnel in the Navy:
Premature separation rates in excess of 33 percent among Navy enlistees
have recently been reported (Sands, 1978). Declining numbers of citizens
in the primary recruiting age groups, a slowly improving economy
providing alternative employment opportunities, and increasing
technologically sophisticated manpower requirements serve to underscore
the nature of the problem (see, e.g., Sinaiko, 1977).
Apparently, as the saying goes, "the more things change, the more they stay the
same." In the nearly two decades that have passed since the authors delivered this
commentary, early attrition rates have remained virtually unchanged, the current state of
the economy features a 26-year record low unemployment level, and the relentless pace
of technology continues to force intense labor market competition for highly-educated
workers. One other factor that remains unchanged is the military's continued reliance on
educational screening as the primary determinant of enlistment eligibility. For decades,
military manpower planners have held sacred the belief that recruits with a high school
diploma are far more likely to complete their first term of enlistment than are those who
drop out of high school. Numerous studies throughout the years have reinforced this
viewpoint (see, for example, Buddin, 1984, Cooke and Quester, 1992, and Kearl and
Nelson, 1992). Because of the apparent connection between successful completion of
high school and successful completion of one's first-term of enlistment, and because of
1
the simple elegance of the diploma as a selection device, 1 the services have relied very
heavily on, and invested very heavily in, high school diploma graduate (HSDG) recruits.
For the All-Volunteer Force, however, first-term attrition across the military
services has remained stable at approximately 30 percent, despite the increasing
investment in recruiting HSDGs. A 1997 report by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) determined that, in fiscal year (FY) 1994, 96 percent of all military recruits had a
high school diploma. Yet, of the 176,000 recruits who entered the military that year,
25,000 (over 14 percent) were separated with the first six months of service. This
suggests that, while a diploma may be an important predictor of attrition risk, its
effectiveness as a "stand-alone" measure is apparently somewhat limited, implying the
need for a supplementary means of assessing the likelihood of successful person-job
matches within the military.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
This thesis examines one such means of increasing the probability of a good
person-job match—that of providing a realistic job preview (RJP) to military recruits
during the enlistment process. RJPs are intended to provide applicants with a balanced
view of the job in which they are interested, including an honest portrayal of both the
positive and negative job characteristics and conditions of work. Since, presumably,
1 An increase in the number and type of alternate education credentials has complicated the problem. A multi-tiered
system of credential preferences has been developed in response. For more on this, see Janice H. Laurence, Does
Education Credential Still Predict Attrition?, paper presented at the 105
th Annual Convention of the American
Psychological Association, Chicago, IL, August 1997.
2
Fiscal Year 1994 was a perfectly representative year in terms of recruit quality, and the latest for which the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) had complete statistics at the time of the GAO review.
applicants have convinced themselves of the "good" qualities of a job prior to seeking it,
RJPs, by presenting the corresponding "bad" attributes, may serve to reduce these overly
positive expectations. Ifjob seekers accept the job after learning of its undesirable traits,
they may be presumed to be more dedicated to success. They should then be
correspondingly less likely to suffer the unexpected and unpleasant surprises that
contribute to attrition. Results of research in the field of industrial/organizational
psychology suggest that RJPs may help prevent poor person-job matches, resulting in
decreased turnover for new employees.
Are the benefits of RJPs transferable to the military, specifically the Navy? If
potential recruits were exposed to the unpleasant facets ofNavy life prior to their
contractual obligation, would those who elected to enlist be less likely to leave service
prematurely? This research examines previous work in the field for its applicability to




Would the Navy benefit from the administration of pre-hire RJPs?
2. If so, what are the potential benefits?
3 At what costs are these benefits achieved?
4. Are there any other considerations?
5. What is the best way to present pre-hire RJPs?
The approach consists primarily of an extensive literature review of applied
research into the uses and effects of RJP in diverse organizational settings. The literature
concerning the effects of RJP on turnover is substantial. In the combined interests of
brevity and relevance, the studies selected for inclusion in this work were limited and fall
generally into two categories. The first category includes research efforts that are
military-specific, or otherwise topically generalizable to the military. The second
consists of three meta-analyses published between 1985 and 1997. In all, these three
meta-analyses account for a total of 37 studies that are concerned with the effects ofRJPs
on turnover. The use of meta-analyses was selected in consideration of their ability to
quantitatively cumulate results across studies, permitting accurate conclusions based on
many past studies of the same phenomenon. 3
In Chapter n, the Navy's accession processes are reviewed, including the Delayed
Entry Program (DEP), the military's use of educational screens, the trends and costs of
first-term attrition, and labor market theories addressing turnover. This review
establishes a common frame of reference within which to view the person-job matching
process and its consequences. Chapter HI looks at the effectiveness ofRJPs using studies
discovered during the literature review. These studies are examined in the context of
their similarity to the military processes described in Chapter II. Although only the
military-specific cases are discussed in detail, the meta-analyses are cited for their ability
to convey large-scale estimates of effectiveness in a succinct manner. Chapter IV
presents the conclusions of the thesis. Recommendations for follow-on work are
provided, and an initial RJP construct is proposed in Chapter V.
3 See "A Meta-Analysis of the Correlates of Role Conflict and Ambiguity," by C. D. Fisher and R. Gitelson, 1983,
Journal ofApplied Psychology, 68, pp. 321-322, for a comprehensible discussion of meta-analytic theory.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL SCREENING
In Screeningfor Service (Eitelberg, Laurence, and Waters, 1 984), the authors
refer to a scene from the 1939 film classic, The Wizard ofOz. In this scene, the
Scarecrow, having reached the Emerald City, is told by the Great and Powerful Oz:
Why, anybody can have a brain, that's a very mediocre commodity. Back
where I come from we have great universities, seats of great learning
where men go to become great thinkers. And when they come out they
think deep thoughts, and with no more brains than you have. But they
have one thing you haven't got: a diploma.
It is worth noting that the symbolic value of a diploma is as important to
applicants for military service today as it was to the Scarecrow in 1939. Laurence (1997)
credits research conducted by Dr. Eli Flyer in the late 1950s with enlightening military
manpower researchers on the link between high school graduation and the decreased risk
of attrition. With this realization, high school graduation status became a formal part of
the military's selection strategy in the 1960s. Decades of research have since established
the importance of the high school diploma, not as a measure of intellectual capacity or
educational knowledge, but as an indicator of "stick-to-it-ive-ness."
Indeed, the same characteristics that combine to ensure that a person successfully
completes the first 1 2 years of formal schooling indicate a high probability of successful
completion of at least the first term of enlistment. What is less well known is exactly
what those characteristics are, how they are interrelated, or how they may be more
exactly measured. The authors of Screeningfor Service effectively capture this aura of
uncertainty with their suggestion that:
Education level evolved as a screening tool mainly because of its
recognized value in predicting a new recruit's chances for "adapting to
military life." The personal attributes that allow or encourage certain
teenagers to follow through and finish high school—whether maturity,
motivation, ambition, strength of character, determination or persistence,
or, as some contend, the ability to tolerate boredom and routine
—
apparently help to make them more successful members of the nation's
military (Eitelberg et al., 1984).
Whatever the case, high school graduates do have a significantly lower attrition rate for
the first term of service than do non-graduates. Estimates of the degree to which the
attrition risk is reduced vary, largely as a result of the differences in explanatory variables
and estimation techniques between models. The proliferation of alternate credentials has
also complicated estimation. In general, though, the argument for preferential
recruitment ofHSDGs has a great deal of validity—to a point. A 1997 analysis of thirty-
six month attrition for Navy enlistees between 1988 and 1993 reveals that high school
graduates had an attrition rate of 28.7 percent, compared with 49.0 percent for holders of
a high school equivalency certificate and 53.0 percent for non-graduates (Laurence,
1997). The results of this analysis of observed attrition rates by education credential,
service, and tier placement4 are summarized in Table 2.1, and serve to illustrate the
differential effect of the high school diploma in comparison with its alternatives.
4 The three tiers represent, in decreasing priority, the military's preferences for education level. Technically, any
credential within the same tier has equal value.
Table 2.1 Thirty-six Month Attrition Rates for FY 1988-1993 Non-prior-service
(NPS) Accessions by Education Credential and Service.
Marine Air All
Tier /Education Credential Army Navy Corps Force Services
Tierl
High School Grad 30.4 28.7 28.6 23.4 28.5
College - One Semester 45.5 44.2 41.9 21.0 43.3
- 2 Years or More 23.0 22.6 25.7 16.6 22.3
Adult Education 44.4 46.0 41.3 42.9 44.8
Tier 2
H. S. Equivalency 49.1 49.0 50.4 37.7 48.7
H. S. Cert, of Attendance/ Completion 44.6 45.9 40.7 19.8 41.6
Occupational Program Certificate3 30.5 31.2 46.2 40.8 35.6
Correspondence School Diploma2 52.0 33.3 46.1 0.0 44.1
Home School Diploma 61.9 42.9 42.9 46.5
Tier 3
Less than H. S. Diploma 53.2 53.0 47.6 37.5 52.7
3 These two credential types should be interpreted cautiously because of small sample sizes. Number of recruits in
these categories ranged from 5 Correspondence School Diplomas in the Air Force to 141 Occupational Program
Certificates in the Navy.
- - Entry omitted due to coding confusion.
Source: Adapted from J. H. Laurence, Does Education Credential Still Predict Attrition? Paper presented at the 1 05 th
Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Chicago, IL, August, 1997. The original source is
DMDC.
Keep in mind, though, that the overall attrition rate of approximately 30 percent is almost
exclusively attributable to the high percentage ofHSDG recruits who comprise the force.
In other words, if almost all enlistees are HSDGs, then, by definition, they are responsible
for almost all first-term attrition. This observation begs the question: Is 30 percent the
"natural" rate of attrition and one that the Department of Defense (DoD) is condemned to
tolerate; or, could other measures be taken to supplement the effectiveness of the high
school diploma, and improve the screening process, such that only the most committed
recruits are permitted entry?
If completion of high school is an indication of adaptability, then a measure of
aptitude is also needed. For this, specialized tests or test composites, such as those on the
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), and the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT) are used. Introduced in July, 1950, the AFQT was intended
from the outset to be used as a screening device in conjunction with the reinstitution of
the Selective Service draft. Bernard Karpinos (as cited in Eitelberg, et al., 1984) relates
that the AFQT was developed and fielded for the purpose of both (a) measuring the
"examinee's general mental ability to absorb military training within a reasonable length
of time, so as to eliminate those who do not possess such ability;" and (b) providing "a
uniform measure of the examinee's potential general usefulness in the service, if
qualified on the tests."
The AFQT has, of course, evolved throughout the years since its introduction.
Over the past 40 years, the individual services have also instituted a variety of
supplementary tests to augment the outcomes provided by the AFQT. On January 1,
1976, the ASVAB was introduced DoD-wide as the single test battery for both selection
and classification. The ASVAB did not replace the AFQT, but merely incorporated its
components within a larger testing instrument. Of the ten subtests that comprise the
ASVAB, four—Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics Knowledge, Word Knowledge, and
Paragraph Comprehension—are combined to derive the AFQT score. The test scores
obtained from the AFQT reflect population percentiles of measured aptitude.
Figure 2. 1 shows the categories that have been derived by the Navy to indicate
preferences in recruit educational and aptitude attainment. Using the high school
diploma as a proxy for attrition risk, and the AFQT score as a proxy for successful
training outcomes, these categories were developed to rank the desirability of different
recruits. Throughout the services, the preferred recruit is an "A-cell" applicant.
Commonly called "high-quality" recruits, these people have both a high school diploma
and have an AFQT score in the upper 50 percentile (category IIIA or above). As
indicated by the "B-cell," non-high school graduates must score in the upper half of the
AFQT to enlist. Despite the apparent implications of the matrix, applicants from the
"Cu-cell" are preferred to those from the "B-cell," since the high school diploma is




















Figure 2.1 Navy Recruit Quality Matrix.
Source: Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC), 1998.
By law, the services cannot accept any applicants with an AFQT score below the
10
th
percentile (Cooke and Quester, 1992), and people with AFQT category IV scores
(10th to 30
th
percentiles) are normally ineligible for enlistment regardless of high school
diploma status. Non-high school graduates are allowed to enlist in very limited numbers,
but must have relatively high AFQT scores (B-cell), and show proof of previous
employment success or a family connection to the Navy. In 1997, up to 5 percent of the
Navy's recruiting quota was reserved for non-high school graduates (Burlage, 1997).
These screening measures—HSDG status and AFQT score—have come to define
the military selection and screening process. Because these measures are based on very
large numbers of individual observations taken over a period of many years, they have
evolved into a reliable method of assessing attrition risk for different categories of
applicants. Yet, the very reason that contributes to their predictive consistency may
detract from their absolute utility. The use of any screening device that is based on
population averages functions as a form of "statistical discrimination" (Ehrenberg and
Smith, 1994). In other words, while it may seem more efficient to select people based on
their resemblance to the average characteristics of some group, there is an implied risk
that equally valuable, but less obvious, individual merits may be overlooked.
The military has experimented with compensatory screening models (CSMs) that
rely on "biodata"
—
past biographical information—to attempt to define individual-level
factors that could compensate for the weaknesses of traditional educational screens. The
power of biodata is thought to exist in the presumption that "the best predictor of future
behavior is past behavior" (Edwards, McBride, Waters, and Laurence, 1993). These
models have not found widespread acceptance within the services, however, and the use
of educational screens continues to predominate.
10
It seems, then, that organizations that statistically discriminate run the risk of
missing out on applicants who may more than make up for in desire what they lack in
talent. Such organizations should be alert to the possibility that the cost of excluding
highly motivated, but non-traditional, applicants may exceed the savings generated by
statistical screening devices. The apparent inability of the services to reduce attrition
below 30 percent, despite their belief in the value of traditional educational screens, may
serve as just such an alert, as well as an incentive to continue to look for compensatory
methods of screening individuals for the characteristics that define successful military
service.
B. THE JOB-MATCHING PROCESS AND ITS COSTS
Evidence suggests that young people—the primary recruiting population for the
armed forces—experience a high degree ofjob mobility. A recent study of wage growth
and job mobility among young men determined that, during the first ten years of labor
force participation, a typical young man will hold seven of the ten jobs that he will have
in the course of his career (Topel and Ward, 1992). Cooke and Quester (1992) cite a
1989 study by Markey and Parks that tabulated male responses to the January 1987
Current Population Survey question, "Were you doing the same kind of work a year
ago?" The percentages of young men who reported a transition in employment type are
shown by age group in Table 2.2:
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Table 2.2 Percent of Young Men Who
Reported a Change in Employment Type,







Source: Adapted from T. W. Cooke and A. O.
Quester, "What Characterizes Successful Enlistees
in the All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Male
Recruits in the U.S. Navy," Social Science
Quarterly, 73 (2), 239-25 1 . The original source is
a question on the January 1987 Current Population
Survey (CPS).
This behavior demonstrates the person-job matching process at work, a process
often predicated on imperfect information. People frequently take jobs knowing little of
the actual conditions of employment. Once hired, employers and employees concurrently
evaluate the job match; if either is dissatisfied, one or the other initiates a quit.
This job-matching process is expensive for both industry and the military,
particularly in terms of recruiting and training costs. The Navy Recruiting Command
estimates that its recruiting costs range from $2,000 per non-graduate, to $7,000 for a
high school graduate with an AFQT score in the upper 50th percentile. They further
estimate that 90 percent of these costs are dedicated toward bringing candidates to the
point of signing an enlistment contract (Bonn and Schmitz, 1995). Added to this is the
cost of basic training, nominally estimated at $8,000 per recruit, with follow-on training
for some skills costing in excess of $45,000 (Cooke and Quester, 1992). In 1995, the
12
Army estimated that it spent an average of over $24,000 per enlistee for recruiting, initial
processing, training, and job placement (Martin, 1995).
In aggregate terms, GAO (1997) estimated that, in 1994, DoD invested $390
million ( 1 996 dollars) in enlistees who never made it to their first duty station, because
they had separated within the first six months. About 60 percent of this total, or $23 1.8
million, was spent on enlistees who separated within the first two months (roughly
equivalent to the length of basic training). The Navy share of these costs was $126.9
million for six-month attrition, of which $81.1 million (64 percent) represented boot
camp losses.
When employees leave an organization, the employer incurs sunk costs in
recruitment, hiring, and training. These same costs are then required to attract and train
replacements. Further, the replacement employee incurs additional costs in terms of
initial lower productivity—the so-called "learning curve." Not only is the replacement
initially less productive, but the supervisors' productivity also suffers until the new
employee is able to perform at the expected level. The combined effects of extensive
supervisory attention and a low initial skill level commonly result in negative net
productivity. To illustrate, the typical Navy Electronics Technician (ET) with nuclear
power training will spend an average of two years in training, or under supervision,
before reaching zero net productivity 5 (Marcus and Quester, 1984). In 1996, the average
cost of nuclear power training was estimated to be $100,000 (Lieutenant Commander
5 Net productivity is the contribution of the trainee to unit output. It is negative if the trainee and the supervisor
together produce less than the supervisor would have produced without responsibility for training the individual. Zero
net productivity is the point at which the trainee's contributions to output just balance the output lost as result of
supervisory efforts.
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Tom Wears, USN, personal communication, March 23, 1998). This example is not
unique, and serves to emphasize the point that the military model of expensive, front-
loaded technical training is especially sensitive to early attrition.
To summarize, the military spends a great deal of money recruiting and training
its new entrants. Much of this expense is incurred before recruits ever reach their first
operational assignment. Yet, the military's primary recruiting market
—
young high
school graduates with little or no experience in the workforce—may be characterized by
high rates of turnover, perhaps caused by uncertainty or imperfect information in
evaluating potential job matches. Improvements in matching people with jobs may
reduce the training costs associated with early attrition.
C. THEORIES OF SEPARATION BEHAVIOR
Discussions of employee turnover often center on the distinctions between
voluntary separations (quits) and those that are involuntary (fires). A "quit" occurs when
the employee becomes dissatisfied with the conditions of employment, while a "fire"
indicates dissatisfaction on the part of the employer. These are obviously opposite
actions, yet they lead to the same outcome. For that reason, it is sometimes difficult to
distinguish between the two—a problem familiar to researchers. If they could be
adequately isolated, though, the behaviors underlying the outcomes could be more
accurately analyzed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that people often have a hidden
agenda that camouflages their true intent. In the civilian workforce, for example,
voluntary quits usually result in denial of unemployment benefits. To protect their
14
entitlement, some people may shirk, or otherwise set themselves up to be involuntarily
separated, since non-adverse involuntary separation does not disqualify them from
receiving such payments.
In the context of military service, voluntary quits are seemingly not an option.
Yet, clearly, many who enter service will leave before they have fulfilled their enlistment
contract. Because all early discharges are at the convenience of the government, all first-
term attrition could technically be categorized as "fires." This would be incorrect,
however, since at least some adverse discharges are undoubtedly the end result of a
lengthy and carefully orchestrated attempt on the part of the enlistee to initiate the action.
A pattern of misconduct that eventually ends in discharge might be characterized as
service-initiated, when, in fact, the individual's goal from the outset was to achieve just
such a result.
Previous research appears to bear this out. Stolzenberg and Winkler (1983) cite a
1 977 study by Greenberg, Murphy, and McConeghy in which it appeared that "some
dissatisfied Marine enlistees circumvent legal restrictions on quitting military service by
'harassing' their supervisors with misconduct, thereby inducing early 'involuntary'
discharge." A more quantitative approach is evidenced in the results of a Navy study,
also cited in Stolzenberg and Winkler (1983). Their synopsis states:
Guthrie, Lakota, and Matlock (1978), Lau (1979), and Advanced Research
Resources Organization (1979) report the impact on terminations from the
Navy of an experimental program to allow dissatisfied personnel to
terminate before completion of their term of service. Participants in this
program were permitted to quit any time between completion of
apprenticeship training, and 1 8 1 days of active duty, or with six months
notice subsequently. After 23 months, attrition was much higher for
participants in this experimental program (73 percent) than for members
15
of a control group (48 percent). The proportion of honorable to
dishonorable discharges was much greater among participants in the
experimental program, suggesting that "involuntary" discharges may be
induced in the absence of freedom to quit (Guthrie, Lakota, and Matlock,
1978).
GAO ( 1 997), meanwhile, contends that "an enlisted person who exhibits a
situational adjustment problem in adapting to military life is separated from the Air Force
for a personality disorder, from the Navy for an erroneous enlistment, and from the
Marine Corps for failing to meet minimum performance standards." In the final analysis,
whether the termination was organizationally or individually initiated may be immaterial.
In a general sense, the fact that such separations occur at all, particularly given the
consistent frequency of the event, suggests that poor person-job matches are being
regularly created. The necessity to prevent such job mismatches is obvious. What is
apparently required is a means of improving the amount and quality of information vis-a-
vis the contracting parties.
D. A CASE FOR SUPPLEMENTARY SCREENING METHODS
As mentioned previously, numerous studies have been conducted into the causes
of, and explanations for, first-term attrition of enlistees. A common theme among these
studies is their reliance on primarily econometric methods, the examination of
demographic characteristics, such as age, race, education, and socioeconomic status, and
economic factors, such as unemployment rate and civilian-military pay differential, for
their predictive power in reference to attrition and performance. The general consensus
of these studies is that a high school diploma and an above average AFQT score are
16
effective proxies for both lower attrition risk and higher performance. Yet, as shown in
Figure 2.2, Navy attrition trends remain essentially constant despite the upward trending








































Figure 2.2 Navy First-term Attrition Rates vs. Percentage of High Quality Recruits
for FYs 1986-1991.
Source: Recruiting data are from D. Bonn, personal communication, January 14, 1998. Attrition data
adapted from GAO, DoD Could Save Millions by Better Screening Enlisted Personnel, 1997.
Having econometrically identified the qualities desired in enlistees, what labor
market behaviors should the military employ to attract and retain these applicants?
Principally, the military utilizes a combination of economic incentives. These incentives
include comparatively high entry-level wages, targeted enlistment and reenlistment
bonuses, and a wide array of fringe benefits, including medical and dental coverage,
discounted shopping privileges, and liberal leave policies. These pay mechanisms have
proven effective in attracting recruits and preventing excessive personnel shortfalls in
17
critical ratings. It is arguable, however, whether these incentives represent the most
effective or efficient means by which attrition may be reduced.
Labor market theory offers additional insight into the job selection and retention
behavior of individuals. The authors of the textbook, Modern Labor Economics
(Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994) note that quit rates decrease with increasing job tenure.
They attribute this to a job-matching process in which workers do not always have good
information about the jobs that they seek. Only after they begin employment do they
begin to accumulate factual knowledge about the conditions of work. Ehrenberg and
Smith suggest that the connection between job tenure and quit behavior represents a job-
matching process in which "workers who realize, after the fact, that they have not made a
good match will quit their jobs and seek employment elsewhere. Workers with long
tenure will disproportionately be those who believe they have good matches and thus will
have low quit rates."
A 1984 study of early military attrition behavior (Buddin, 1984) offers two
hypotheses that also seek to explain the underlying causes of attrition. These job-
matching hypotheses are as follows.
Job-Matching Hypothesis #7: Mostjob separations occur at
low levels ofjob tenure.
This is primarily a result of experiencing the job match. If both employer and
employee are satisfied with the match, the likelihood of attrition decreases with
increasing tenure. On the other hand, poor job matches are quickly identified, and often
as quickly acted upon, by one or both parties. Second, increasing job tenure usually
implies that a person has a greater investment in firm-specific human capital; in other
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words, the skills and training that contribute to success in their present job, but are not
necessarily transferable to other jobs (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994).
Job-Matching Hypothesis #2: More uncertainty about the
initial employment contract increases the possibility of
mismatching and separation.
Simply, the better informed an applicant is about the conditions of the job in
question, the less likely the chance of a poor match. Obviously, the better the person-job
match, the less the risk of dissatisfaction and eventual attrition.
Admittedly, these hypotheses do not lend themselves to empirical analysis, as
they are heavily dependent upon variables that are not easily measured. Nonetheless,
they provide a critical frame of reference for evaluating alternative counter-attrition
strategies.
E. A REVIEW OF THE ACCESSION PROCESSES
1. Recruiting
As of 1998, the Navy currently recruits to a predetermined level of about 56,000
people per year. As previously mentioned, the preferred recruit is a HSDG with an
above-average score on the AFQT. The ease with which recruiting targets are met
depends on a variety of factors, some of which are certainly beyond the control of the
individual recruiter, or even the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC). For
example, the Navy Recruiting Command more or less directly controls the number of
recruiters in the field and the size and application of the advertising budget. However,
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CNRC can only react to the economic impacts of national and local unemployment rates,
or the relative parity of military to civilian pay.
In tough recruiting markets, standards may be arbitrarily lowered to meet the
Navy's demand for new recruits. When the supply of potential enlistees is more plentiful,
the reverse is true. Meeting these quality and quantity standards is the primary goal of
the individual recruiter. As a recent example, an article in Navy Times noted that
recruiters were faced with a potential shortfall of 1,500 enlistees for the first quarter of
FY 1998, which began October 1, 1997. In response, recruiters were given permission to
"front-load" their annual quota of "traditional" applicants without high school
diplomas—that is, those who have AFQT scores in the upper 50th percentile. Although
the article stated that plans to lower enlistment standards had also been discussed, Vice
Admiral Daniel Oliver, Chief ofNaval Personnel, was quoted as saying, "We will miss in
quantity before we miss in quality" (Burlage, 1997). In fact, though, shortly after that
article was published, the Navy began admitting up to 1 ,000 non-high school graduates
with AFQT scores in category IIIB—the 31 st to 49th percentiles—a target population
normally avoided (personal communication, Captain W. S. Wolff, USN, December 18,
1997). Officials have also discussed a plan to allow the entry of some HSDGs with
AFQT scores below the 3
1
st
percentile, the current cutoff point for enlistment (personal
communication, D. Bohn, January 14, 1998). To compensate for the lower overall AFQT
composite, these applicants must have a high, specific score on a particular ASVAB
subtest. For example, an above-average mechanical aptitude score on the ASVAB could
result in assignment to a mechanically-oriented occupation.
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These proposals are a clear signal of the difficulties facing recruiters in the current
economy. This reluctant retreat from the traditional "bulwarks" of recruit quality is also
indicative of the way in which quality goals may be defined by forces external to DoD.
Still, the Navy's reaction to these recruiting problems—and its willingness to consider
alternate means of selecting applicants—may indicate that institutionalized attitudes
concerning traditional measures of recruit quality are shifting. If so, then exploration into
other, less-traditional means of recruit selection and screening may be timely and
appropriate.
2. Delayed Entry Program
In 1 960, the armed forces instituted the DEP as a means of assisting military
recruiting by providing individual draft deferments of up to 4 months (Kearl and Nelson,
1992). Since that time, the DEP has been used as a vehicle by which the services manage
the flow of enlistees into basic training or, for the Navy, Recruit Training Command
(RTC) and subsequent training or operational assignments. Although originally intended
and utilized as a "queuing" device, the DEP also has "evolved into a low-cost marketing
tool to help recruiters penetrate the high school market" (Bohn and Schmitz, 1995).
Entrants into the DEP are tested, screened, and classified. Many are then provided a
guaranteed reservation for training in the career field of their (qualified) choice.
Participation in the DEP is essentially a one-sided contract that favors the
individual. A potential enlistee's "reservation" is held with merely a statement of intent
to enlist. DEP lengths may generally be as long as 1 2 months, depending upon the
availability of advanced training opportunities and the desires of the individual.
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Nominally, however, even direct-entry enlistees spend at least 72 hours in DEP, awaiting
the results of blood tests (R. L. Brummit, personal communication, February 10, 1997).
Research suggests that the risk ofDEP attrition increases with longer DEP lengths
(Kearl, Home, and Gilroy, 1990). In a comparison of high school seniors and people in
the workforce, Bonn and Schmitz (1995) found that seniors were in the DEP about twice
as long (278 days versus 132), and quit at a greater rate (21.4 percent versus 14.2) than
did entrants from the workforce. The fact that people in the DEP quit is not surprising, as
they may continue to evaluate current employment (or other offers), the qualities of
which are more clearly known, against the lesser-known circumstances of their active
duty reservation. Although entry into the DEP constitutes a bona fide legal commitment
on the part of the enlistee, the services have chosen not to enforce the contract for those
who elect to leave the program. A recent Navy study revealed that high school seniors in
the DEP quit before entering active duty at a rate of 21 .4 percent. Of those persons
entering from the work force, 14.2 percent changed their mind before reporting to boot
camp (Bohn and Schmitz, 1995). In the era of the All-Volunteer Force, DEP attrition,
while undesirable, is not uncommon.
Longer DEP lengths are not all bad, though. These same studies have found an
interesting complement to the higher quit rates of long DEP lengths in that the longer a
person "survives" in the DEP prior to entry, the lower the risk of early active-duty
attrition. For example, Bohn and Schmitz (1995) also found that HSDG recruits with
AFQT scores in the upper 50th percentile who have no time in the DEP have an attrition
probability of 26 percent within the first two years of service. Conversely, for equivalent
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recruits with nine months in the DEP, the two-year attrition risk decreases to 1 7 percent.
The authors hypothesize that this a function of the recruit's commitment to military
service. That is, a person who is willing to commit to a wait of several months before
entering active duty is apparently more committed to succeed once military service
begins.
The DEP, as it is currently structured, is little more than a waiting line for entry.
After the initial program entry requirements have been met—testing, medical
examination, and selection of occupational choice—members may have very little
interaction with recruiters until they actually report for active duty. This observation
suggests that the DEP may be an opportune time to begin the socialization of potential
recruits, by exposing them to the expectations and traditions of their new employer.
Early organizational socialization may leverage the increased commitment hypothesized
above by Bonn and Schmitz (1995), resulting in more favorable outcomes upon
commencement of active duty.
F. CONCLUSION
DoD has developed a highly evolved and carefully crafted screening process
based upon educational achievement and measures of demonstrated aptitude. Faith in
this system is indicated by the services' investment in primarily HSDG applicants, in
particular those who are categorized as "A-cell" recruits. Yet, this steadily increasing
investment in quality (as currently defined) has had no apparent effect on the attrition
behaviors of a workforce where one of three new employees fails to complete the initial
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term of enlistment. The loss of these human resources is expensive, even for an
organization with a $24 billion personnel budget. 6 Moreover, even the best estimates of
attrition-related costs are understated; they fail to account for the time, energy, and
administrative or legal costs involved in pursuing early separations to conclusion.
Despite the efforts of many talented researchers who have tackled the attrition problem,
much remains unknown. It certainly appears that the HSDG model, although powerful, is
failing to sufficiently capture the myriad reasons and complex interrelationships that
underlie the stay/quit decision. Solutions to the problem of first-term attrition may lie in
supplemental selection and screening criteria. An examination of other theories that may
help explain how successful person-job matches are formed is necessary and appropriate.
The following sections address one such theory, that is, providing applicants with a
realistic exposure to the conditions of work and lifestyle that accompany their decision to
accept an offer of employment from the Department of the Navy.
6
Budget figure represents FY 1999 projections and includes Navy and Marine Corps, active and reserve
components.
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III. REALISTIC JOB PREVIEWS
A. REALISTIC JOB PREVIEWS DESCRIBED
Many employers have turned to realistic job previews (RJPs) as a means of
improving the person-job match and thus reducing turnover. An RJP is a means by
which applicants, or recent hires, are exposed to the requirements of their new job. As
opposed to the interview process, which is often used as a means of selling the position,
RJPs do not merely emphasize the positive aspects. Rather, they are intended to give the
candidate a more balanced view of the job. This includes exposure to characteristics of
the job that might be considered objectionable. It is reasonable to expect that candidates
for any position have convinced themselves of its positive aspects. RJPs, by introducing
some of the less desirable job factors, reduce what may otherwise be unrealistic
expectations. Applicants who accept a job after having been exposed to both its negative
and positive characteristics may demonstrate a greater degree of commitment to success
in their new position. It follows that the person-job match should be improved as a result.
The following sections examine the hypothesis that RJPs result in better person-
job matches, as evidenced by lower turnover. This is accomplished by examining the
results of previous research within the context of the accession and initial training
processes of the Navy. The studies presented were selected specifically for their
relevance to these processes, in hopes that they may offer a new perspective on the
traditional methods by which the Navy selects, trains, and socializes its new entrants.
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B. RETENTION AND PERFORMANCE EFFECTS
1. A Brief Review of Previous Meta-Analytic Research
Extensive research has been conducted into the efficacy of RJPs as they relate to
turnover. Among this body of work is a collection of meta-analyses that are intended to
provide generalizable results obtained from a weighted comparison of many individual
studies. In 1985, McEvoy and Cascio conducted a review of 15 RJP experiments
involving a total sample size of 5,250 participants. The results of their analysis indicate
that RJPs reduce turnover rates by approximately 9 percent. It was their contention that a
9-percent gain was rather modest, and they suggested that "managers might do well to
look elsewhere when seeking turnover reduction strategies to implement prior to hiring"
(McEvoy and Cascio, 1985). This comment, however, should be taken in the context that
they concurrently conducted a meta-analysis of five job-enrichment studies. In
comparative terms, the results of the concurrent study indicated that job-enrichment
strategies appeared to be twice as effective as RJPs in reducing turnover. One item of
particular interest in their study was a tabulated presentation of the 1 5 studies that were
used for the meta-analysis. An abbreviated version of their presentation is reproduced
below, as Table 3.1. Examination of the studies in Table 3.1 reveals that seven of the
fifteen reported statistically lower turnover for the experimental or preview group. Two
of the studies reported higher (but insignificant) turnover for persons exposed to an RJP.
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Source: Adapted from G. M. McEvoy and W. F. Cascio, "Strategies for Reducing Employee Turnover:
A Meta-Analysis," 1985, Journal ofApplied Psychology, 70, 346-347.
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Another example, and one that is frequently cited in the literature, is a 1985 study
by Premack and Wanous. These authors conducted a meta-analysis of 21 RJP
experiments (with a total sample size of 6,088 observations), many of which were also
included in the work of McEvoy and Cascio (1985). Despite the use of similar meta-
analytic techniques, the authors noted several differences between the two efforts.
Addressing the issue of content overlap, Premack and Wanous state that their study is 40
percent larger since they included seven studies not covered by McEvoy and Cascio.
Premack and Wanous also excluded a "secondhand" report of the two Raphael studies
because these were considered to be neither experiments nor bona fide RJPs. The authors
also criticized McEvoy and Cascio for using only the longest available follow-up period
to calculate attrition, when more than one point in time may have been available.
Another contrast in methodology is noted in that Premack and Wanous chose to
concentrate on the most realistic of the previews if more than one type of RJP group was
mentioned in the source literature.
The results of this meta-analytic study suggested that RJPs are effective, albeit
modestly, in reducing turnover. Additionally, RJPs appear to increase the drop-out rate
among job candidates—an effect that the authors contend enhances self-selection
behavior. The study also included a table that illustrated the effects of RJP on
hypothetical job survival rates and the cost savings possible from using RJPs. The
survival rates used by Premack and Wanous—low, medium, and high—are intended to
7
Premack and Wanous did not discuss what criteria they used to determine the degree to which one preview
was considered more realistic than another for between-group comparisons.
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illustrate the relative effectiveness of RJPs in different situations. The original table was
calculated using a somewhat arbitrary 1984 estimate of the $2,800 replacement cost for
bank tellers. Their estimate has been modified here to reflect recent Navy estimates of
recruiting and training costs, and is presented as Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Estimating Employee Replacement Cost Differences With and Without
anRJP.
Job Survival Rate
Measure Low Medium High
Mean survival rate without an RJP .20
Estimated survival rate with an RJP .248
Percentage increase in survival rate
3 24%
Number of recruits needed to retain









Annual replacement costs at
$15,576 per recruitb $778.8 Million $3 1 1 .5 Million $194.7 Million
Number of recruits needed to retain
1 0,000 at the estimated survival rate 40,323 17,857 11,792
Estimated annual replacement costs $628.1 Million $278.1 Million $183.7 Million
Estimated cost savings using RJP $150.7 Million $33.4 Million $11 Million
a
This figure represents the percentage point difference in turnover between the survival rate with and
without an RJP (i.e., .56 is a 12-percentage point increase in survival over .50).
b Replacement cost estimates are from D. Bonn and E. Schmitz, Delayed Entry Program Policy: Reducing
Personnel Costs Through Efficient Planning, by D. Bohn and E. Schmitz, 1995, Commander, Navy
Recruiting Command, and include recruiting, and basic and initial skill training for the typical recruit.
Source: Adapted from S. L. Premack and J. P. Wanous, "A Meta-Analysis of Realistic Job Preview
Experiments," 1985, Journal ofApplied Psychology, 70,706-719.
As Table 3.2 shows, RJPs apparently have a differential effect that is dependent
upon the initial survival rate. In particular, these results suggest that RJPs appear to work
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best where they are needed most. Jobs with low turnover are probably inherently more
desirable and RJPs seem to have little effect on the survival rate. Conversely, turnover in
undesirable jobs, as indicated by lower job survival rates, appears to be more greatly
reduced by using RJPs (Premack and Wanous, 1985).
The most recent example of a meta-analysis of RJPs was performed in 1 997, and
represents the first such effort since that of Premack and Wanous. Building on the work
of their predecessors, Phillips and Gully conducted a meta-analysis of 33 published and
unpublished studies and papers, with a total sample size of 13,479 observations. Their
work sought to "extend previous research on the effects of RJPs on performance and
turnover by including many studies not identified or available in previous meta-analytic
efforts" (Phillips and Gully, 1997).
The authors used essentially the same methodological and computational
techniques as McEvoy and Cascio (1985), and Premack and Wanous (1985), and
obtained similar results. It is their contention that RJPs reduce turnover, a finding that
was moderated by the timing of the RJP offering. Specifically, RJPs that were given
after the applicant had already been hired suggested the potential for a reduction in
turnover of 3-percentage points. An RJP offering prior to job acceptance had nearly
double the effect—resulting in an estimated lowering of attrition risk by 6 percentage
points. Phillips and Gully (1997) suggest that their estimates, while modest, have
promising payback potential for organizations in which the cost of intervention is low
compared with the resulting savings.
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2. Examples of RJPs in Military-Like Settings
As previously mentioned, the DEP is little more than a waiting line for entry into
the active-duty Navy. Thus, it appears that the DEP would be a particularly opportune
time to administer an RJP. Introducing an applicant to the work and life-style spectrum
of the military should provide an improved person-job match upon commencement of
active duty. Some objections to introducing an RJP might be expected, given that the
DEP is an integral part of the recruiting process. Chief among these objections is the
presumption that, if RJPs were instituted during the recruiting and DEP processes, the
rate ofjob acceptance for initial entrants into the DEP would decline, necessitating an
increased number of contacts to meet the recruiting quota. One might also argue that,
even if enough prospective applicants could be initially attracted into the DEP, attrition
during the length of the program would increase in relation to the increased insight into
the demands of military service.
While these seem on the surface to be legitimate concerns, it would be impossible
at this point to estimate the potential impact on recruiting, since the Navy Recruiting
Command does not track the "contact-to-contract" ratio or similar measures of recruiter
productivity. As the saying goes, "it's tough to figure out where you're headed if you
don't know where you are."
A literature review of military-specific RJP research revealed no instances in
which RJPs were offered to potential enlistees prior to their contractual obligation. This
is likely due to the belief that exposing potential enlistees to the more objectionable
qualities of military life would add to the difficulties in attracting enough high-quality
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recruits. Fortunately, it is possible to draw some inferences from the results of other,
similar research.
A study of particular relevance was conducted in 1988 that examined the
effectiveness of the Pre-Initial Entry Training (PIET) program currently in use by the
Pennsylvania Army National Guard (PAARNG) (Schuler, 1988). Army initial entry
training (IET) is comprised of Basic Combat Training (BCT) and Advanced Individual
Training (AIT). In 1985, the attrition rate for PAARNG recruits undergoing IET was
approximately 30 percent. Reportedly, recruits from Pennsylvania were experiencing
high attrition rates due to attitude problems, inadequate physical conditioning, and pre-
existing and disqualifying medical and legal problems. In response, the Adjutant General
for Pennsylvania (TAGPA) initiated the PIET.
The objectives of this initiative focused on better pre-screening to eliminate
attrition due to pre-existing problems. Schuler (1988) also cites TAGPA Circular 351-8,
which includes additional directives "to provide training which will prepare recruits for
IET (BCT/AIT) by assisting them first hand to become more familiar with the training
requirements of basic training" and "to insure recruits know that the entire chain of
command cares and wants them to successfully complete IET training both for
themselves and the PAARNG."
The PIET is a four-day, 35-hour course of instruction that convenes on
Wednesday and runs through Saturday. On the following Monday, PAARNG recruits
report to the Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) for processing and travel to
their place of IET. The PIET is also administered to high school students who enlist in
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the summer prior to their senior year. These recruits then attend BCT during that same
summer, and the following summer they receive a PIET refresher before departing for
AIT.
During the PIET program, enlistment eligibility is verified, and personnel and
medical records are pre-screened. The recruits undergo what is called "true confessions,"
during which they are encouraged to discuss privately with a drill instructor any legal,
moral, or medical problems that would disqualify them for enlistment. This thorough
pre-screening helps prevent subsequent problems at MEPS or IET. Recruits are also
exposed to the history and traditions of the National Guard, with a focus on the PAARNG
and their individual units. Finally, they undergo training in personal hygiene, physical
conditioning, the M-16 rifle, and IET orientation (Schuler, 1988).
The first cohort ofPAARNG recruits who had received this pre-entry program
entered basic training in November 1985. A 21 -month attrition study began with that
initial group and continued until July 1987. Of the 3,261 recruits who were sent to IET
during this period, over 96 percent successfully completed the training. A comparison of
the attrition rates between the PAARNG and its contemporaries reveals that the 3.6
percent attrition rate experienced by PAARNG recruits compares very favorably with the
overall Army National Guard rate of 5.5 percent for the same period. Further comparison
of this period reveals attrition rates of 4.9 percent for the Army Reserve and 5.3 percent
for the regular Army (Schuler, 1988).
The PAARNG estimates the cost of its program for the 21 -month period to be
$357,000 (1988 dollars). Using an IET cost estimate of $20,000 per recruit (which
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excludes recruiting costs), Schuler (1988) concluded that the savings generated by having
an attrition rate of 3.6 percent, as opposed to the Army National Guard average of 5.5
percent, totaled $ 1 .2 million. More important than the impressive short-term dollar
savings is the improved readiness realized by the reduced attrition. The author also
determined that, if the total Army, including the Guard and Reserve, had reduced its
attrition rate to 3.6 percent for the period, they would have fielded 5,646 more soldiers.
What was not mentioned in these cost calculations, unfortunately, is the effect (if
any) that exposure to the rigors of impending training had on retention of recruits during
the PIET phase. It is unclear whether the observed reduction in active-duty attrition is
due solely to the training provided, or whether recruits who would have eventually
separated did so instead during the PIET program. Certainly, attrition that occurs during
PIET is preferable to attrition during IET. Early attrition avoids the costs involved with
transportation, processing, and the training of recruits. Nevertheless, all attrition—early
or later—still means increased recruiting costs of replacements. Although this program
appears to be otherwise cost-effective, it is impossible to determine, in absolute terms, the
effectiveness of the program with the recruiting costs excluded.
Despite the scarcity of military-specific cases, organizational research has been
conducted that is probably transferable to a military setting. One particularly intriguing
study examined the rate ofjob-acceptance for correctional officers who were exposed to
a pre-hire RJP (Meglino, DeNisi, and Ravlin 1993). This study is of interest because of
the apparent similarities with the military lifestyle. For example, the authors observed
that "correctional officers must, of necessity, perform their duties in restricted
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environments that are removed from public view." Certainly, this is true of many, if not
most, military operations and training exercises. Life aboard a ship at sea is similar to the
isolated environment within a correctional facility in this respect. Also, the average
length of time between application for the position and the start of work was slightly
more than three months. By comparison, the average DEP length for Navy enlistees is
approximately four months (R. L. Brummit, personal communication, February 10,
1997).
Applicants for the position of correctional officer were required to meet certain
age requirements, possess a high school diploma, and pass a reading examination—not
unlike military standards for entrance. Finally, the similarities are fairly obvious between
the requirements for both military personnel and correctional officers to wear uniforms
and demonstrate proficiency with firearms. Less obvious, but equally relevant, was the
attempt on the part of the Meglino et al. (1993) to focus on the "probationary" phase of
employment. The authors described probationary employees as "often required to
perform more menial duties, denied certain privileges, and subjected to greater scrutiny
than permanent employees." This description accurately captures the essence of basic
and initial training of military recruits. During these early phases of their tenure, recruits
relinquish nearly all of their personal freedom, have no clothing other than issued
uniforms, perform many objectionable tasks, and are under constant supervision.
Probationary employees are also said to be "substantially less attracted or attached
to an organization until they achieve permanent status. Even when these types of formal
categories do not exist, newcomers are often subjected to less desirable treatment during
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early 'stages' of socialization in an organization" (Meglino et al., 1993). This, too, seems
a particularly relevant statement, given the nature of initial military socialization and the
observed attrition associated with the process.
Because the corrections officer job has many unpleasant aspects, the RJP
administered was a "reduction" preview. That is, it was designed to reduce applicants'
overly positive expectations. It was hypothesized that persons who were exposed to the
preview would be less likely to accept the job, but more likely to stay in the job if they
took it.
The subjects were 1,158 people who had submitted an application for
employment as a correctional officer, each ofwhom was randomly assigned to a
"preview," or "no preview" group upon initial application. Of this number, 1,117 met the
basic requirements for the job and were offered employment. This group formed the
initial sample for the study and was comprised of 621 men and 496 women, 133 ofwhom
had previous correctional experience. An offer of employment was accepted by 358
people, including 55 who had previous correctional experience. Persons assigned to the
preview group were shown a 22-minute, videotaped presentation that contained
descriptions of pay, benefits, and other work conditions. A visual depiction of the
required duties was provided, with accompanying narration by actual officers and
inmates. The presentation emphasized the excessive paperwork, difficulties of dealing
with inmates, and the pervasive stress. A section that was described as "particularly
graphic" depicted the potential for being hurt on the job.
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Figure 3.1 reveals some surprising results. In contrast to the hypothesis, the
results indicated that, for the total sample, applicants who saw the preview were more













Figure 3.1 Job Acceptance Rates (Percent) by Prior Correctional Officer
Experience and Job Preview Group Status.
Source: Adapted from B. M. Meglino, A. S. DeNisi, and E. C. Ravlin, "Effects of Previous Job Exposure
and Subsequent Job Status on the Functioning of a Realistic Job Preview," 1993, Personnel Psychology,
46.
applicants in the preview group accepted the job, versus 29.2 percent of those in the non-
preview group. Similar results were observed among those who had no prior experience.
Opposite results were noted for applicants with prior experience; when exposed to the
preview, they were far less likely to accept the job offer (Meglino et al., 1993).
Differences in attrition rates were also observed among the corrections officer
preview groups, as displayed in Table 3.3. Interestingly, both acceptance rates and
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retention rates during an initial probationary period were lower among prior-service
officers who were given the preview. Still, retention was higher for officers with prior
corrections experience than for those with no prior experience in the preview group, once
permanent status was achieved. In keeping with the authors' expectations, turnover rates
were lower for persons without prior experience who achieved permanent status and were
exposed to the preview (Meglino et al., 1993).
Table 3.3 Attrition Rates (Percent) By Employment Status,
Prior Correctional Officer Experience, and Job Preview Category.
Employment Status Overall Preview No Preview
Total Sample
All New Hires 43.6 43.0 AAA
Probationary 51.0 53.5 47.7




All New Hires 42.6 41.1 44.5
Probationary 48.5 48.4 48.7
Permanent 35.1 32.9 38.5
Prior Correctional
Officer Experience
All New Hires 49.1 53.1 43.5
Probationary 64.5 76.2 40.0
Permanent 29.2 9.1 46.2
Source: Adapted from "Effects of Previous Job Exposure and Subsequent
Job Status on the Functioning of a Realistic Job Preview," by B. M. Meglino,
A. S. DeNisi, and E. C. Ravlin, 1993, Personnel Psychology, 46.
Because almost all new military entrants have no previous experience, this result
is probably the most clearly transferable to the military hiring model. Although this
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particular study did not detect statistically significant differences in retention between
groups, it serves to underscore an important lesson, and one that we are often condemned
to re-learn, that is, "no magical cures will compensate for jobs which are inherently
undesirable" (Meglino and DeNisi, 1987).
All military recruits enter their respective services through some program of basic
training. It is at this point that the ability to opt out of the job becomes more difficult,
due to the contractual obligation accompanying this training. This contract makes the
option to quit considerably more difficult and complicated. Nonetheless, at least some
recruits are reportedly aware of methods that may be used to facilitate their early (and
honorable) discharge from recruit training (Meglino, DeNisi, Youngblood and Williams,
1988).
The primary purpose of basic training is to inculcate new recruits in military
values, traditions, discipline, and decorum. This training is designed to be stressful, and
it functions as a screening device to identify persons who cannot meet the rigorous
demands of military service. Basic training is also designed to provide recruits with a
general set of skills that prepares them for immediate assignment to an operational unit,
or more commonly, further training. In this type of post-hire environment, Wanous
(1979), and also Miceli (1983), are cited by Phillips and Gully (1997) for their suggestion
that a more appropriate term for RJP is "realistic socialization," since the opportunity to
select out of the application process no longer exists. This argument would appear to be
especially germane to enlistees who are now contractually bound. Semantics aside,
military-specific research into the effects of post-hire RJPs has been conducted.
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In 1979, a study of 678 male Marine recruits undergoing basic training at the
Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Parris Island, South Carolina provided some insight into
the impact of RJP on attrition and performance (Horner, Mobley, and Meglino, 1979).
An RJP known as PIRATE, or Parris Island Recruit Assimilation Training Exercise, was
jointly developed by the Parris Island Training Support Center and researchers from the
University of South Carolina. The format was an 80-minute video, including realistic
footage from all phases of recruit training. The video used interviews and voice-overs
from a cross-section of recruits and drill instructors (DIs) to furnish accurate information,
provide role models, and demonstrate coping skills. During the development of the
video, it was described that:
Interviews were conducted with poor, average, and good performers.
Some who had dropped out were also interviewed. . . . The RJP film was
based primarily on information gained from these interviews. Those areas
that the recruits said they wished someone had told them about early in
their training were included. Recruits were shown going through some of
the training that was perceived to be the greatest cause of concern among
recruits. Voices of the recruits and their instructors were played over the
picture. The voices explained how the recruit should react to certain
situations and the voices gave advice on how to cope with the training.
. . .The role models chosen for the film were not pre-selected for voice or
appearance. Most of the scenes were shot as the recruits were actually
undergoing the training. The good as well as the average and poor
performers were depicted in the film (Horner et al., 1979).
Recruits were randomly assigned to either the preview group, a "placebo group"
that watched a series of three traditional Marine Corps films, or one of two control
groups, with one of each type of group represented within each of three separate training
battalions. The experimental design also called for the administration of a series of
questionnaires. The primary difference between the groups was related to the number of
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surveys in which they participated. The placebo group received the entire treatment with
the exception of the actual film, while the control groups differed primarily in the number
of questionnaires administered (Horner et al., 1979).
The RJP was presented on the second full day of training and was subject to 21
separate hypotheses, including reduced attrition and higher performance. The experiment
was conducted in April of 1979, which proved to be especially interesting. During the
summer months, average education level—a measure of recruit quality—increases as the
surge of high school graduates reports for training. Demographics for the experimental
group were compared to the total population of male recruits entering Parris Island during
late 1977 through mid- 1978. In comparison with this population, the experimental
sample was representative in terms of age, race, and AFQT. However, because the
recruits studied were selected in April, a time when arrivals tend to have lower average
education levels, the experimental group had an average of 1 1.3 years of education,
(statistically) significantly less than 1 1.7 years of education for the total population. Of
particular interest, the experimental group was comprised of significantly fewer high
school graduates, 56.2 percent, than the population average of 75.5 percent.
Recruits who were previewed on what to expect during recruit training
demonstrated lower attrition at three months than did the placebo or control groups.
Although the three-month results shown in Table 3.4 were not statistically significant,
they were in the right direction and seemed to support the hypothesis of reduced attrition
(Horner et al., 1979).
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Table 3.4 Marine Recruit Attrition Rates (Percent) at Three Months by
Experimental Group and Battalion, 1977-1978.
Treatment Placebo Control I Control II Total




































Battalion C Sample Size 62 61 53 58 234
Separations 7 9 7 7 30
Percent U3 14jj 132 123 12.8
Total Sample Size 174 174 166 164 678
Separations 18 27 26 22 93
Percent 103 153 15/7 13^4 13.7
Source: Adapted from S. O. Homer, W. H. Mobley, and B. M. Meglino, "An Experimental Evaluation of
the Effects of a Realistic Job Preview on Marine Recruit Affect, Intentions and Behavior," 1979, Arlington,
VA: Office of Naval Research.
More importantly, though, attrition rates for the preview group were (statistically)
significantly lower at both the six-month and one-year points. Table 3.5 displays the
cumulative attrition rates of the preview group at the six-month and one-year points in
comparison with the control groups. The reduced turnover noted for the preview group at
six-months was not significant when compared with that of the other groups. However,
the attrition differences were found to be significant when comparing the preview group
with the combined results of other groups. For the measure taken at the one-year point,
attrition risk was found to be significant when compared with the three control groups
individually or collectively. Horner et al. (1979) concluded that the RJPs not only
affected turnover, but that the effect "became more pronounced with time."
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In a self-admittedly subjective line of reasoning, the authors suggested that
"perhaps the initial impact is to salvage those marginal newcomers who make it through
the hard times and then become less likely to leave as things get better" (Horner et al.,
1979).
Table 3.5 Six-Month and One-Year Cumulative Attrition by Experimental






























Total Sample Size 174 504 678
Source: Adapted from by S. O. Homer, H. Mobley, and B. M. Meglino, "An
Experimental Evaluation of the Effects of a Realistic Job Preview on Marine Recruit
Affect, Intentions and Behavior," 1979, Arlington, VA: Office of Naval Research.
Differences in performance were also noted between groups. Performance was
assessed using two separate measures. The first was a composite score of graded
evaluations of military skills known as Military Skills Marks (MSMs), believed to be an
objective and comprehensive criterion. The second measure was indicated by the number
of recruits who were required to repeat some portion of the training, a process referred to
as "recycling" (Horner et al., 1979).
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Group-wise comparison demonstrated higher performance for the preview group,
with the placebo group having the lowest performance scores as measured by the MSMs,
although these differences were insignificant. When the preview group was individually
compared with all other groups combined, significantly higher performance was
observed. There were, however, no significant differences between the experimental
group and the control groups in the number of recruits who were recycled. This was
believed to be due to problems associated with using recycling as a performance
measure—recruits are apparently sometimes recycled for reasons unrelated to
performance. This is at least partially due to the subjective nature of the measure, as only
one or two drill instructors can initiate a recycling action.
In their conclusion, Horner et al. (1979) offered a simple methodology by which
to calculate the cost-savings achievable from reductions in attrition. Using their estimate
of the 4.6 percent reduction in boot camp attrition noted for the preview group, they
suggest that the potential savings are (4.6 percent x N) x basic training cost, where N is
the annual number of recruits participating in basic training. Converting this cost
equation into current dollars and number of recruits involves multiplying their 4.6 percent
estimate by the Navy's FY 1998 recruiting goal of about 56,000 recruits (D. Bonn,
personal communication, January 13, 1998), and multiplying again by the $12,077 GAO
(1997) estimate of the Navy's investment in each enlistee by the completion of boot
camp. The total theoretical savings of this computation is just over $31.1 million—
a
figure that represents a 38 percent reduction in the estimated $81.2 million cost ofNavy
boot camp attrition (GAO, 1997).
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Shortly after the report by Horner et al. was released, and possibly based on its
results,
8
the Navy developed and fielded its own RJP study (Lockman, 1 980). The RJP
experiments were conducted first at Recruit Training Center (RTC) Great Lakes, and
later at RTC San Diego. At the conclusion of the two experiments, the results were
compared for both absolute and relative effects. Each experiment lasted for six weeks,
during which every other company of incoming recruits saw an RJP videotape. The
report does not elaborate on the content of the RJP video, except to say that "its purpose
was to provide recruits with a realistic picture of what they could expect during recruit
training" (Lockman, 1 980). During the study period, 2,607 recruits at Great Lakes, and
2,05 1 recruits at San Diego were assigned to either the preview or no-preview groups. In
all, 1,342 recruits at Great Lakes were presented the RJP, compared with 1,049 at San
Diego.
The methodology of the Lockman (1980) study attempted to determine the
relationships of seven variables
—
years of civilian education, AFQT, age, race, DEP
participation (yes or no), class of service (regular or reserve), and RJP viewer status (yes
or no)—upon recruit training attrition. Interactions of RJP viewer status with education,
AFQT, and age were also tested for their differential effects. It was believed that,
because the (unnamed) Marine Corps study had neglected to account for these
demographic variables, the reduced attrition noted for Marine recruits may have been
8
In the introduction, Lockman cited a Marine Corps study that reported reduced recruit training attrition for
viewers of an RJP film. Unfortunately, the cited study was not included in the list of references. Given the
dearth of military-specific research into this topic, the timing of the respective reports, and based in part on
the description of the methodology used in the unnamed Marine Corps study, this appears to be the report
to which Lockman was referring. Attempts to contact the author for verification were unsuccessful.
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improperly attributed to the effects of the RJP, rather than to the differences in these
characteristics.
Between the two RTCs, it was noted that the experimental group at Great Lakes
was, on average, one year younger at entry, had slightly lower average AFQT scores,
participated in DEP and the reserves in smaller proportions, and demonstrated
significantly higher rates of attrition from recruit training. Aside from the absolute
differences in attrition between RTCs, results from each experimental group were
markedly similar. Presentation of the RJP appeared to have no significant effect on
attrition at either location. Attrition for RJP viewers at Great Lakes was 14 percent,
slightly higher than the 13.6 percent attrition rate for non-viewers. At San Diego, persons
who were presented an RJP were discharged at a rate of 9.4 percent, versus 9.9 percent
for those who did not receive an RJP (Lockman, 1980).
In the final analysis, Lockman (1980) concluded that the RJP video did not, in and
of itself, predict attrition at RTC. Rather, the traditional screening factors that are
currently employed—education, AFQT score, and age—appear to be the best predictors
of attrition for enlistees.
It is unclear whether these results are more or less valid than those of the Horner
et al. (1979) study of Marine recruit attrition. This report offered very little detail on the
content of the RJP offered. Assuming that it was an effective presentation, limiting the
measurement period for attrition to RTC only—a period of about eight weeks—neglects
9 A period of six months was allowed to elapse before the experimental groups were tracked to determine
whether or not they had been discharged from recruit training.
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the long-term effects of the RJP on first-term attrition. Also, attrition trends at RTC are
often cyclical, and may sometimes depend more upon externalities than on the
differences in demographic characteristics, or whether or not recruits are exposed to
pending training requirements. A comparison with historical trends for each RTC would
have been of analytical value.
The results of the Lockman study serve as a reminder that RJPs are somewhat
situationally dependent. They require thoughtful insight into the characteristics of the
job, an appropriate presentation, and a receptive audience. Whether or not the RJP
offered meets these characteristics is potentially an issue. If this is not the case, however,
then these results may be an indication that RJPs are simply not the most effective means
for reducing turnover in every situation.
A more recent example of military-specific research into the effects of RJPs is
evident in the 1988 study of Meglino, DeNisi, Youngblood, and Williams. This
experiment was performed with 533 male and female recruits undergoing Army basic
training. In a departure from previous work in the field, the methodology consisted of
offering a combination of previews—either a reduction preview (designed to reduce
overly positive expectations), an enhancement preview (intended to dispel overly
pessimistic perceptions of the difficulties of some aspects of training), both previews, or
no preview (control group). It was hypothesized that turnover would be lowest for
persons who received both previews, followed by the reduction group, the enhancement
group, and, finally, the control group (Meglino et al., 1988).
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Four companies of Army trainees were used for the study, three of which were
composed entirely of men, and the fourth exclusively of women. Each company was
composed of four smaller units called platoons. Within each company, each of the
platoons was randomly assigned to one of the four experimental groups. Each of the four
treatment groups was found to be equivalent on standard demographic measures such as
age, race, AFQT score, and education level. The only significant difference among
groups was attributable to gender. Although the authors noted that women tend to be
discharged prematurely at a rate greater than that of men, separate analyses revealed no
treatment-related differences between the genders. Thus, attrition rates for the different
groups were reported for the sample as a whole (Meglino et al., 1988).
With respect to the previews, the reduction preview was a 24-minute film that
emphasized that the greatest challenges faced by recruits were not related to training
events, but in adjusting to Army life—homesickness, lack of privacy, being subject to
command authority, and anxiety over relations with the drill instructors and physical
requirements. The film also offered strategies for coping with stressful situations.
The enhancement preview, on the other hand, was a 27-minute film that described
in some detail the impending training requirements. The film depicted some of the more
worrisome events in training, such as firing weapons, using hand grenades, living under
field conditions, and gas chamber training. Also included was an accurate presentation of
the demands of the daily schedule and the requirements for graduation.
All of the trainees were also asked to complete pre-test, post-test, and follow-up
questionnaires as part of the experiment. These were intended to measure such outcomes
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as level of initial commitment, job satisfaction, and feelings of trust and honesty. Pretest
surveys were administered at the end of the first day of processing. Following exposure
to the previews the following day, post-test measures were collected. The follow-up
survey was administered five weeks later.
A comparison of turnover rates among the different groups is shown in Table 3.6.
Based on results obtained from the pretest surveys, separate estimates were derived for
recruits who had reported high levels of initial commitment to the organization (defined
as at or above the mean for all recruits who had completed the pretest), as well as for
recruits with relatively high AFQT scores (50th percentile or greater).
Table 3.6 Turnover Rates (Percent) for Army Recruits by Preview Group Status,



















Source: Adapted from B. M. Meglino, A. S. DeNisi, S. A. Youngblood, and K. J. Williams, "Effects of
Realistic Job Previews: A Comparison Using an Enhancement and a Reduction Preview," 1988, Journal of
Applied Psychology, 73 (2), p. 263.
In contrast to hypothesized expectations, the group that had received the reduction
preview only exhibited the highest rate of turnover. Meglino et al. (1988) attribute this to
the fact that the RJP contained more negative information than is usually found in a
preview of this type. Evidence to support this argument came from the results of the
post-test preview administered to the reduction group. Recruits who had seen only the
reduction preview expressed greater levels of anxiety about "getting along with others,
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and anticipated lower security, growth, and social satisfaction" than did the other groups
(Meglino et al., 1988). The authors also suggest that this outcome may represent a
"threshold effect" in which the "beneficial effects of a reduction preview will be
diminished or eliminated when the amount of unexpected negative information reaches a
level that prompts a substantial number of individuals to refuse employment or to leave
the organization" (Meglino et al., 1988). Persons who are most committed to the
organization are apparently immune from this effect, according to the authors. In fact,
attrition for "high commitment" recruits who were shown the reduction preview is much
lower than that for the control group, lending credence to this argument (Meglino et al.,
1988).
The attrition rate for high commitment recruits in the control group and high
AFQT recruits in general was also somewhat of a surprise. One might expect that
recruits with high levels of initial commitment would be the most dedicated to
completing basic training. Similarly, more "intelligent" recruits (as indicated by AFQT
score) might be thought to have higher levels of reasoning ability that would allow them
to "see through" the exaggerated behaviors and discipline that characterize boot camp
—
contributing to more effective coping mechanisms. The authors suggest that these results
may in fact be perfectly reasonable:
That is, those individuals who are most committed to an organization
before they learn the "truth" about their job, may also be those who
become the most disillusioned, and therefore more likely to leave, when
the job does not live up to their expectations, or when they discover that
the organization has been less than truthful. This may also be true for
more intelligent individuals.... (Meglino et al., 1988).
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One could also make the argument that more intelligent individuals may also be
more accustomed to success, as indicated by their higher levels of academic and
intellectual achievement, possibly less tolerant of petty annoyances, and more confident
of success outside the military.
Clearly, the greatest effect on turnover in this experiment was associated with
exposure to both the enhancement and reduction previews. Not only was turnover
absolutely lower for this group, but the results were significant regardless of which
group, or combination of groups, was used for comparison. These effects were
magnified for both high AFQT and high commitment recruits. The increased
effectiveness noted for more "intelligent" recruits may be due to higher attentiveness and
increased comprehension of the preview content. The high commitment recruits, on the
other hand, may have interpreted the previews as a sign of the caring nature of the Army,
further reinforcing their decision to enlist.
Ultimately, the results make a strong case for providing a balanced preview to
newcomers. Exaggerating either the positive or negative characteristics of a job could
have negative repercussions when the true conditions of work are discovered. Such
outcomes could include not only higher turnover, but may also involve some loss of
credibility for the organization.
C. OTHER EFFECTS
The previous discussions have centered almost exclusively on the relationship
between RJPs and job turnover. While this is in keeping with the primary theme of this
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thesis, there are other dimensions of RJPs that deserve mention. Careful consideration of
the side-effects or opportunities associated with incorporating RJPs into the military
hiring process should help clarify the non-quantitative—such as psychological or
social—costs and benefits of the action. This section discusses some of the secondary
outcomes and considerations related to RJPs.
1. Reciprocity
One of the more interesting conceptual aspects, and one that is rarely highlighted
in RJP literature, is reciprocity with regard to evaluating the person-job match. Clearly,
the benefits of reduced turnover resulting from RJPs are reciprocal—the organization
saves recruiting and training time and money, while the individual, having made a better
person-job match, begins to acquire tenure, implying a higher rate of income growth and
increased job satisfaction. Still, it appears as though the benefits of improved
information concerning the person-job match accrue mostly to the individuals. If
provided an RJP, applicants have greater insight to the conditions of work and ideally
self-select into jobs for which they are better suited—the employer benefits only
indirectly in the form of reduced turnover. Yet, the very process of extending an RJP
implies an opportunity for the employer to concurrently evaluate and screen the
characteristics of the candidate for the position.
An excellent example of this process of reciprocal evaluation is evident in the
hiring practices used in the Georgetown plant of Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky
(TMMK). As of August, 1997, the plant had received over 200,000 applications for
7,500 available jobs since it began hiring in 1986 (Maynard, 1997). To ensure that only
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the best-qualified applicants are selected from this large pool of candidates, TMMK uses
a lengthy and thorough series of screening mechanisms. The Toyota plant also has a
Web page that discusses the traits desired in applicants—team skills, problem-solving
ability, education, potential, and a desire to learn—traits touted as being more highly
valued than prior experience, according to a January, 1998 visit to their site, "what you
can expect as a TMMK team member." The site states clearly that "candidates undergo
intensive assessment and evaluation to ensure that those hired have the ability and
motivation to sustain our tradition of excellence" (Toyota Motor Manufacturing of
Kentucky, 1998).
This "intensive assessment and evaluation" process begins with all applicants
filling out an initial application, which serves as a low-cost initial screen. Some of these
applicants are then provided the opportunity to fill out a formal application and take a
written test. The next steps involve participating in up to eight (unpaid) hours of
problem-solving sessions and group discussions and submitting to even more written
tests. Candidates who remain after this step now participate in the highlight of Toyota's
screening process—the "Day of Work." This step involves four hours of (unpaid)
simulated assembly-line work, and is designed to identify applicants who have the
physical dexterity and problem-solving abilities required of assembly-line workers, as
well as the attitude to excel in a team-oriented environment (Maynard, 1 997).
Applicants who successfully complete the "Day of Work" are eligible to be
interviewed formally, a process that takes approximately one hour. Survivors of the
interview process enter the "active consideration pool," where they may wait for up to
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two years for an initial job offer, depending on employment opportunities. Once a
preliminary offer is made, the applicant undergoes a physical exam, and then meets with
placement personnel to determine an appropriate assignment. Finally, TMMK makes a
final job offer to the applicant (Maynard, 1997).
Although the use of assessment tests is common in the highly competitive
automotive industry, experts say Toyota's process is the most elaborate (Maynard, 1997).
TMMK estimates that it costs $2,500 per new-hire to operate the Assessment Center. It
feels that the costs of the program are more than justified, however, not only by a
remarkably low annual turnover rate of only 3.5 percent, but also by the qualitative
successes enjoyed by the organization in its ten years of existence (S. Stone, personal
communication, March 6, 1998).
While it seems apparent that better person-job matches are being created, as
evidenced by TMMK's relatively low turnover rate, it is equally apparent that the implicit
employer-employee contract comes with a greater degree of reciprocal knowledge. The
lengthy and taxing hiring process used by TMMK not only provides applicants with a
realistic, first-hand view of what to expect as a member of Toyota's workforce, but it also
provides TMMK with a summary measure of the candidate's commitment to the job.
Although TMMK will screen out many applicants who are willing to see the process
through, some will self-select out of the process, a common example being those who
head out for their lunch break during the Day of Work and never return. Maynard ( 1 997)
cites the example of one woman, who, after asking permission to use the restroom,
disappeared—all that was found was her nametag, left on the restroom sink.
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2. Timing and Presentation Medium
Evidence suggests that the timing of RJPs
—
pre- or post-hire—as well as the
presentation medium—verbal (face-to-face), audiovisual, or written—appear to have
moderating effects on both turnover and performance (Premack and Wanous, 1985;
Phillips and Gully, 1997). The use of pre-hire RJPs may strengthen the "self-selection"
effect, by discouraging those who are alerted to the potential of a poor person-job match.
Job-seekers who continue with the application process after being made aware of the
negative aspects of a job are presumed to have more commitment to the job. Because
their expectations are more realistic, and correspondingly more likely to be met, it is
usually hypothesized that pre-hire RJPs should be associated with lower rates of attrition.
In a metaphorical sense, it has been observed that:
The RJP functions very much like a medical vaccination in its attempt to
deflate newcomer expectations. That is, it is designed to prevent
newcomer dissatisfaction, rather than reduce it after the fact. The typical
medical vaccination injects one with a small, weakened dose of germs, so
that one's body can develop a natural resistance to that disease. The RJP
functions similarly by presenting job candidates with a small dose of
"organizational realty." And, like the medical vaccination, the RJP is
probably much less effective after a person has already entered a new
organization (Popovich and Wanous, 1 982).
Post-hire RJPs, on the other hand, assist in the organizational transition, or
socialization, of recruits. Because the information presented is of fairly immediate value
to newcomers, they may be more attendant to its content. Post-hire RJPs may also help
newcomers develop coping mechanisms that reduce anxiety about the negative aspects of
their new job, as well as reduce role ambiguity—the uncertainties surrounding position,
responsibilities, expectations, and rewards. Thus, the greatest gains for post-hire RJPs
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are hypothesized to be related to increased on-the-job performance (Phillips and Gully,
1997).
A 1997 meta-analysis by Phillips and Gully examined the relationship between
the timing of RJPs, and the effects on turnover and performance. The authors concluded
that pre-hire RJPs had the greatest impact on reducing turnover. As previously
mentioned, pre-hire RJPs were estimated to reduce attrition rates by 6 percentage
points—twice the gain of a post-hire RJP. Post-hire RJPs, though, were shown to have a
stronger moderating effect of measures of performance. These findings were consistent
with their hypothesized expectations (Phillips and Gully, 1 997).
The differential effects of the type of presentation medium may be an important
consideration. The means by which RJPs are presented have also been linked to turnover
and performance. RJPs may be presented verbally, for example, in an interview, or a
face-to-face meeting between job incumbents and applicants. Audio-visual methods,
perhaps using videocassettes or CD-ROMs, are another available mechanism, and are
suitable for use on a larger scale. Written RJPs, in the form of pamphlets or brochures,
may also be used.
Because verbal RJPs provide for the opportunity to not only ask questions about
the job, but may also include the opportunity to observe and experience, first-hand, the
environment and responsibilities of the job, they could be presumed to have an important
effect on job acceptance rates and eventual job satisfaction. They have the potential to be
rather costly, however, particularly considering the interrupted productivity of the
incumbent, in addition to the costs of development.
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Audio-visual methods should also be highly effective, as they have the added
advantage of offering a carefully scripted demonstration of successful role models and
coping mechanisms. Videos are relatively inexpensive to produce, and can be used in
geographically dispersed interview and work locations—a plus for many large
organizations. One possible drawback, though, is the necessity to ensure that videos are
up-to-date, implying recurring expenses for organizations with constantly shifting job
responsibilities.
Written brochures or pamphlets have the potential advantage of being able to
contain a large amount of detailed information. They are also comparatively inexpensive
to produce and distribute. A drawback to written RJPs concerns the requirement of
applicants to not only read, but also comprehend, the information contained within.
Premack and Wanous (1985), considering only written and audio-visual RJPs,
determined that audio-visual presentations were associated with higher job performance,
while written RJPs seemed to have a very slightly negative effect. Phillips and Gully
(1997), also determined that audio-visual RJPs were linked to higher job performance,
followed by verbal presentations, with written RJPs being the least effective.
3. Attitudinal Effects
Premack and Wanous (1985) described the RJP-related effects of organizational
climate as "several related perceptions of the new organization, such as the degree to
which it is seen as supportive, trustworthy, honest, or candid in its portrayal of a job to a
candidate." It has been commonly hypothesized that presentation of an RJP increases the
regard that individuals hold for a prospective employer since the offering of an RJP may
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be felt by applicants to be demonstrative of an organization's integrity, concern for
employees, or a climate of caring and trust. If true, then presentation of an RJP should
lead to such outcomes as fewer thoughts of quitting, greater job satisfaction, and higher
levels of commitment to the organization.
Results of research into these hypotheses are mixed. In their study of Marine
Corps recruits at Parris Island, Horner et al. (1979) cite Wanous' 1973 findings of an
experimental group that was provided a pre-hire RJP reported both significantly fewer
thoughts of quitting (considered to be a precursor to turnover) and significant increases in
job satisfaction in comparison with the control group. Horner et al. (1979) also cite Ilgen
and Dugoni (1977) whose post-hire RJP experiment found increased levels ofjob
satisfaction that, although statistically insignificant, were consistent with the results
obtained by Wanous. The results of the authors' own study, however, contradicted these
findings—discovering neither increased job satisfaction nor decreased thoughts of
quitting among Marine recruits provided with an RJP. The Horner et al. (1979) study
did, however, find directionally correct, but statistically insignificant, increases in self-
reported levels of coping ability and feelings of trust and honesty toward the Marine
Corps (Horner et al. 1979).
Meglino et al. (1988), in their study of the effects of a pre-hire RJP offered to
applicants for the position of correctional officer, reported that those who were provided
an RJP saw the Department of Corrections as more honest and trustworthy. However,
this RJP experiment appeared to have little effect on self-reported levels of anticipated
job satisfaction or increased organizational commitment.
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Finally, Premack and Wanous (1985) offer a succinct and general summary of the
psychological effects of RJPs in their commentary that:
Specifically, RJPs appear to lower initial expectations about a job and the
organization, to increase the number of candidates who drop out from
further consideration for a job, to increase initial levels of organizational
commitment and job satisfaction slightly, to increase performance (for
audiovisual RJPs), and to increase job survival. On the contrary side,
RJPs were found to slightly reduce the favorableness of a job candidate's
perception about the "climate" of honesty, supportiveness, and
trustworthiness in the new organization and the newcomer's ability to
cope with a new job. These latter two findings must be interpreted with
caution, because they are based on the fewest number of studies and
include a much smaller number of people in comparison with other criteria
assessed here (Premack and Wanous, 1985).
The results of prior research are somewhat equivocal with respect to the many
hypothesized psychological dimensions of RJPs. No clear explanations can be found of
"how" RJPs work. These dimensions are important, nonetheless, and awareness of their
existence may provide an opportunity to design desired outcomes into an RJP from the
outset—ideally leading to improved results.
D. SUMMARY
It is worth mentioning that RJPs of one sort or another are currently enjoying
limited use in certain military settings. For example, in 1996, the Navy developed a
video that is shown to new recruits who are traveling by bus from O'Hare International
Airport in Chicago to RTC Great Lakes. 10 The video depicts actual recruits describing
their experiences at RTC, and provides new arrivals with an overview of recruit training.
Discussion with RTC officials indicates that this video was originally intended to reduce
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stress, including the number of suicidal thoughts and attempts at RTC (Lieutenant R.
Snyder, USN, personal communication, February 4, 1998). Although the theme has
reportedly been changed to reflect the development of "coping skills," in comparison
with the previous, and more negative, theme of "suicide awareness," the video represents
a de facto RJP.
To date, no attempt has been made to connect the use of this video with attrition
trends at RTC (or beyond). Any such attempt would likely be fruitless anyway, since the
RTC training curriculum was completely reengineered at the same time. The ability to
isolate the effects of the video, given the numerous simultaneous changes that were
implemented, would be difficult at best. Anecdotal evidence suggests that recruits value
the ability of the video to mentally prepare them for upcoming training events. This
appreciation of the video is consistently expressed in critiques that are completed by all
graduating recruits (B. Hoag, personal communication, March 10, 1998).
Both the Marine Corps and the Army have also fielded a pre-hire RJP of sorts.
Disturbed by the number of losses at boot camp due to the inability to complete physical
training requirements, both services have begun pre-boot camp physical conditioning
programs for personnel in DEP. Marine recruiters are now required to train weekly with
their enlistees under a program called "Welcome Aboard." This program not only
stresses physical conditioning, but also emphasizes the Navy and Marine core values of
"honor, courage and commitment." The Army program requires that recruiters conduct
fitness exercises at least monthly, with each training session lasting no more than two
10 RTC Great Lakes is currently the Navy's only training base for recruits.
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hours (Bowman, 1997). Although these conditioning sessions are targeted toward very
specific outcomes—the ability to complete, uninjured, the physical requirements of basic
training—they may offer some of the benefits of more comprehensive RJPs, such as
enhancing coping skills and aiding the socialization process.
Also, in 1 99 1 the Army fielded an RJP for Special Forces candidates that is
somewhat of a hybrid
—
post-hire in the sense that applicants are already on active duty,
and pre-hire in the sense that Special Forces is a highly selective, voluntary organization
that applicants must apply to join. This RJP was presented in booklet form to personnel
interested in joining and emphasized pre-conditioning—similar to the Army's current
program for candidates in the DEP. Noting the positive effects this booklet had on
training completion rates—an improvement of 7- 1 5 percentage points—the booklet was
updated in 1994 (U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences,
1998a). The updated version was designed to provide more detailed and realistic
information to soldiers and their families concerning life in Special Forces. Current
proposals to improve the existing RJP include recommendations that recruiters advise
candidates to practice skills that will be required as a member of Special Forces—tasks
such as long-distance hiking while navigating by day and night. It was also
recommended that recruiter incentives be tied to the number of candidates who
successfully complete Special Forces training, rather than the number that the recruiter
can incite to show up (U. S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences, 1998b).
61
These limited pre-enlistment exposures to some of the demands of military
service may represent a gradual movement in the direction of providing RJPs to all
enlistees prior to beginning active duty. Certainly, they provide an opportunity for
further research, and estimates of their effectiveness may offer further insight into the
value of such types of programs for military recruiting and training.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The results of existing research generally support what seems intuitively
obvious—the greater the knowledge that people and organizations have when evaluating
the conditions of future employment, the greater the likelihood that better person-job
matches will be created. Whether the benefits of reduced personnel attrition outweigh the
costs of RJP development and implementation, or imply higher recruiting costs due to
reduced job acceptance rates by potential applicants is, for now, still an open question.
As a recent study suggests, the gains to individuals and organizations of RJPs may be
comparatively inexpensive in terms ofmoney and effort:
Because RJPs are relatively inexpensive to implement, often requiring
little more than a thorough job analysis and open discussions with
incumbents, organizations implementing appropriate RJP programs could
realize huge savings in reduced turnover, decreased selection costs and
increased performance (Phillips and Gully, 1997).
Central to this line of reasoning are the issues of how inexpensive "relatively" is,
and how "huge" are the savings. Premack and Wanous (1985) estimate that an
organization with an initial turnover rate of 50 percent should achieve a decrease of 12
percentage points through the use of RJPs. At the same time, firms with turnover rates of
20 percent should expect to reduce attrition by 6 percentage points. Historical first-term
attrition rates for the Navy fall within this range, implying gains of approximately 8
percentage points—or about 4,500 more sailors per year. If these results are transferable,
the potential savings is approximately $54 million in basic training costs alone, using the
GAO (1997) basic training cost estimate of $12,077 per Navy recruit.
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Although discrete estimates of the effect of pre-hire RJPs within a military setting
are currently unavailable, existing research on civilian firms suggests that the effects are
probably transferable. In the quantitative world of military manpower analysis, simply
accepting that the effects of RJPs on turnover are consistent, even directionally correct,
without some estimate of magnitude, is undoubtedly discomfiting. It represents a leap-
of-faith that few policy-makers would be likely to take. Nevertheless, as Quade (1989)
points out:
A great pitfall of quantitative analysis and modeling is to quantify what we
can, not what is relevant, neglecting the difficult—like the drunk looking
for his key under the lamppost because the light there was better, even
though he had dropped it in the dark around the corner. . . . Judgment and
intuition are an integral part of analysis and cannot be avoided (Quade,
1989).
Recall from the tabulated results of 1 5 individual RJP studies displayed in Table
3.1 that, although seven of reports of reduced turnover were statistically significant, six
were not. An apparent shortcoming of attempting to measure the results attributable to
RJPs is due to an inability to isolate the effect of the treatment, given the psychological
subtleties of the individual decision-making process. An additional source of weakness is
probably resident in the survey measures and other tools that are attempting to quantify
subjective information. In short, at least some of what the researchers have attempted to
measure may be impossible to quantify. As Premack and Wanous (1985) contend, "there
are many reasons why employees leave an organization," and "the impact of the RJP is
limited because it concerns a subset of the factors influencing job survival." This line of
reasoning, admittedly subjective, may serve to explain some of the variability witnessed
between studies. Still, the cumulative evidence suggests that RJPs do, in fact, "work," as
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measured by lower rates of turnover among the newly hired. What is less clear,
apparently, is how they work—knowledge that would be of value in designing the
intended outcomes of an RJP.
It is important to keep in mind, of course, that not all attrition by Navy recruits is
bad. In some cases, personnel turnover is both necessary and desirable. Providing RJPs
will not guarantee that every person who enters the Navy also finds a perfect person-job
match. Since the personal ambitions or desires of individuals are expected to evolve and
change over time, for many, the "perfect" job is a moving target anyway. RJPs appear to
be an effective mechanism for accelerating early, less expensive turnover. The combined
effects of forcing early turnover and improving the person-job match should result in a
force that is less likely to be deluded by unexpected job characteristics and outcomes,
more committed to those jobs, and less likely to discharged prematurely after the Navy's




If the results observed in the studies that were reviewed in this thesis are
replicable, then there appear to be quantifiable benefits to the military of administering
RJPs to potential enlistees. In particular, the greatest gains seem to be tied to providing
new recruits with some type of audio-visual RJP prior to active duty. Given the variety
and complexity ofNavy occupational areas, a continuum of RJPs, ranging from general
to job-specific (paralleling the early training processes), is probably the most appropriate.
The following section offers recommendations for further research, as well as a general
approach to developing just such a continuum.
A. FURTHER RESEARCH
Developing empirical estimates of the effects of pre-enlistment RJPs would
require additional study, considering that research into this specific question is
(apparently) yet to be addressed. Researchers have been aware of shortcomings in this
area for some time now. In their 1979 study of Marine Corps recruits, Horner et al.,
offered the following suggestion:
Conceptually and pragmatically an experimental evaluation of RJPs at the
recruiting step, prior to joining, is needed. While the recruiting function
may object, it could be argued that self-selection decisions will be
improved with a RJP prior to enlistment, thus potentially reducing attrition
among those who join.
An obvious, preliminary step would be to conduct a small-scale pilot project. A
low-risk approach would be to administer a continuum of RJPs, as discussed above, in a
geographic area, or zone, in which Navy recruiting goals are met with relative ease
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(understanding, of course, that these zones are normally relied upon to compensate for
regions that are less productive).
Prior to conducting the pilot study, a baseline assessment of recruiter productivity
within the region in question must be determined. The pilot project should then attempt
to determine the base (or control group) acceptance rate, in comparison with the
acceptance rate for persons who are randomly assigned to a preview group. Use of a
"contact-to-contract" ratio should provide a simple measure of recruiter productivity, as
well as a measure of the effect of RJPs upon job acceptance rates.
Finally, subjects who were provided the RJP should be tracked for some period of
time to determine the effectiveness of RJPs upon retention in comparison with the control
group. The groups should be tracked for at least their first year in the Navy, a period of
time that includes basic and follow-on training. According to the GAO (1997), over one-
half of total first-term attrition occurs in the first year of military service; thus,
meaningful results could be observed rather quickly under this observation scheme.
B. A PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION MODEL
If the benefits of RJPs are transferable to a military setting, as they appear to be,
then the magnitude of the effect may be of lesser concern than the opportunity cost
associated with awaiting the results of further study. In any case, a variety of
implementation options are available, ranging from a relatively simple "one-size-fits-all"
written pamphlet, to highly organized, rate-specific, personal tours of squadrons, ships,
submarines, hospitals or clinics, or construction battalions for prospective recruits. The
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following represents a general overview of but one of many such options included within
this range of possibilities.
Use of the "continuum approach," described in greater detail below, might be the
most effective means of attracting and socializing new recruits. The DEP represents a
particularly appealing opportunity during which to present serial RJPs. Because audio-
visual RJPs have been shown to be particularly effective, and considering the
geographical dispersion of recruiting sites, some sort of video medium might be best
suited for military use. These videos could be either conventional videotapes, or perhaps
computerized videos that are available on CD-ROM or via the Internet. From a
qualitative perspective, computerized presentations hold the promise of appealing to a
more technologically advanced audience, and may be easier to update.
These video presentations should fairly represent a range of military work and
lifestyle factors. Specifically, on the first visit to the recruiting office, an applicant could
be asked to view a short video on life aboard a Navy vessel. The development cost for
this type of presentation is negligible, as it could be obtained from one of the many news
organizations that produce news pieces or short documentaries for public consumption.
On subsequent visits, the applicant could view platform- (ship, submarine,
squadron) and rating-specific videos featuring presentations by job incumbents. This
could help candidates to better select an occupation for which they felt they were suited,
assuming that they were otherwise qualified in terms of education and aptitude.
Location permitting, applicants in fleet concentration areas such as Jacksonville,
Florida and San Diego, California could be offered the opportunity to spend some time
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"job-shadowing." These candidates would visit a squadron, ship, submarine,
construction battalion, or clinic and view first-hand the environment in which they
expected to be assigned. They could accompany "mentors" who were currently working
in the prospective rating, and observe the duties and working conditions associated with
these jobs.
This idea is very similar to the internships offered by countless organizations.
Organizations offer non-paying or low-wage internships as an opportunity for interested
applicants to gain experience in a career field in which they are interested. During the
internship, organizations and individuals concurrently evaluate one another. Internships
are frequently used as part of a larger recruiting strategy, resulting in job offers to high-
performing interns. These offers, if accepted, are thought to be indicative of good
person-job matches.
Finally, the basic training process could be re-engineered to provide a short period
at the beginning of training, similar to the Toyota hiring model (Maynard, 1997), in
which applicants could opt out of the job after being permitted the opportunity to
experience it. This may not be as risky or controversial as it seems at first glance, for a
couple of reasons. First, this suggestion assumes that the people who reported for recruit
training have, by this point, been exposed to several RJPs of varying detail. They have,
by definition, and by personal choice, been carefully screened for this training
opportunity, having had previous chances to discontinue the employment process. This
should somewhat mitigate the risk that they will quit during the initial stages of recruit
training, if given the chance. Further, GAO (1997) estimates that the marginal costs of
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processing and transporting a trainee to boot camp are relatively low—these expenses
include average costs of $83 for transportation to boot camp (plus $83 to transport them
home, should they quit), $91 for a medical examination, and $817 for male recruit
clothing issue ($995 for women). During the entire course of boot camp, it costs an
additional $3,650 to pay, feed and house each recruit (GAO, 1997). Given that the
"penalty-free-withdrawal" from training option would be intended to be offered very
early in the process, only a small portion of that $3,650 expense is of relevance during the
RJP period. Also, the requirement to issue uniforms could be delayed until after the RJP
period. Recruits could be issued inexpensive coveralls until the decision point to
continue in training is reached. Issuance of uniforms after the trial period might even
have a psychologically "binding-in" effect, by representing the first step in the
transformation from citizen to sailor. Finally, it may well be that providing interested
applicants the opportunity to attempt boot camp, without a severe penalty for failure,
might somewhat offset the potential for reduced rates ofjob acceptance associated with
pre-hire RJPs. In other words, more people might be interested in joining the military if
they were given an opportunity to experience the lifestyle on a trial basis. In the end,
only the most committed would still likely survive the trial period, resulting in more
organizationally-desirable recruits.
Should this option be implemented, a logical extension of the model might be to
assign people to RJP groups specifically targeted toward their intended specialties. For
example, a recruit with guaranteed follow-on training in an aviation field would be
assigned to an RJP group that involved aviation-specific exposure. At a minimum,
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separate groups for aviation, surface, and sub-surface communities could be formed.
Recruits who do not have a guarantee for occupational training, or whose follow-on
training included medical or service specialties, could be assigned to the three larger
groups, as necessary, to even the training load, much as they are dispersed throughout the
fleet.
In an absolute sense, the training offered during the RJP, or trial, period should be
difficult, but not overwhelming, and interesting, but relevant. If properly designed, at the
end of the RJP period, the recruits would have been exposed to some of the more
challenging or unpleasant characteristics of their future jobs. Again, this option provides
an opportunity for reciprocity in evaluating the person-job match. The Navy could
invoke its option to reject a candidate just as easily as the candidate could elect to quit the
Navy. This option assumes that a support system exists that enables individuals to make
informed, well-counseled decisions regarding their retention alternatives. Such a
program would also have the potential to accelerate early attrition. For this reason,
savings in later training resources should be observed, since, presumably, at least some of
the early attrition would have taken place anyway, failing the outcomes of this process.
In the end, by strengthening the self-selection effect, the organization and its
people should enjoy the benefits that accrue from improved person-job matches. For
those who choose to quit, allowing them to leave early and without fear of retribution
may have additional, qualitative benefits. Because they were treated with fairness and
honesty, they may return to their communities at least neutral in opinion, but perhaps as
advocates of the military and its selection and training processes.
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Again, this is but one suggestion for implementing RJPs during the initial stages
of organizational entry. It should be emphasized that RJPs can be used not only to offer
information to the applicant that may improve the person-job match, but also to assist in
the transformation process for new entrants. The following quote serves to emphasize the
importance of RJPs for their ability to positively influence the socialization of new
recruits:
The potential to present a favorable climate to newcomers is a strong plus
for RJPs. If for no other reason, organizations should at least attempt
RJPs on moral grounds. Organizations hiring many newcomers who are
entering their first job have an even greater obligation to help the
newcomer adjust as quickly and as painlessly as possible (Horner et al.,
1979).
This may be among the most compelling arguments of all for RJPs. Most people
would probably rather be told the truth rather than have it withheld. The more
information one has when contemplating a decision, the greater the individual volition.
Choices that are made consciously, and with more-or-less complete knowledge of the
consequences, are probably more personally valued. In the end, the effects of "buyer's
remorse" are lessened, resulting in greater satisfaction among all concerned. In the final
analysis, while there may be a price to be paid for honesty in describing the conditions of
employment—in the form of reduced job acceptance—there are possibly even higher
costs associated with being less than honest—higher turnover, lower levels of employee
satisfaction, and organizational reputation.
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C. DIRECT AND INDIRECT COSTS AND BENEFITS
Given the fierce competition for resources within the military, and considering the
difficulties recruiters have had in meeting enlistment targets, the benefits versus costs of
implementing RJPs should be thoroughly considered. Although the literature is very
specific concerning the benefits of RJPs
—
particularly in terms of estimating their effects
on attrition—discussions of costs are far more nebulous. In general, discussions of costs
associated with the use of RJPs are limited to the reduced acceptance rate among
applicants, implying higher recruiting costs, and the cost of developing the RJP itself.
The lack of data regarding baseline acceptance rates for the Navy has already been
acknowledged. Thus, the present study focuses exclusively on developmental costs,
including some of the direct and indirect costs of implementing RJPs on a pre-hire basis.
Several benefits of RJPs are also weighed against these costs. It should be noted again
that the primary argument for adopting RJPs is the reduction of turnover rates for first-
term enlistees. If RJPs were not adopted, the costs and benefits described below would
be basically irrelevant.
In general, the pre-hire studies examined in this thesis demonstrate the value of
RJPs for organizations that hire far fewer people per year than does the military. The
Navy recruiting goal for FY 1998 was 56,000 enlistees (D. Bonn, personal
communication, January 13, 1998). Developing and presenting RJPs on this scale
implies a whole new set of problems. One such problem is the dollar-cost of research
and development. The variety of Navy jobs—administrative, mechanical, food-service,
or special forces, for example—dictates that a number of RJPs would be required. Some
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Navy jobs—those in which attrition is not currently a problem—may not require an RJP,
if reduced turnover is the primary criterion of interest. A thorough job-analysis for each
Navy occupation would be required to ensure that the desired outcomes are modeled in
each RJP offering. If properly developed, though, the RJPs should be useful on a large
scale in terms of recipient population and time. Simply put, many potential enlistees
could be exposed to the RJPs over some period of time, the length of which is dependent
not only upon the initial quality of the RJP design process, but also on the stability of the
work environment being presented. The estimated costs of development could be
amortized on a per-person basis with regard to the number of people expected to be
exposed to the RJP during its projected period of validity. This calculation would allow
an individual-level comparison of RJP development costs with the marginal costs of
recruit training discussed earlier in this chapter. Unfortunately, estimating these
development costs is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Once these jobs are analyzed, and RJPs developed (if necessary), a means of
providing the preview must be established. One way that may hold down costs is to
make the RJP available on the Internet, which could reduce the costs of distributing and
updating the RJP. At the same time, recruiters would be required to have Internet access,
since it is likely that technologically-disadvantaged youth would not otherwise be able to
obtain the information.
The savings resulting from any hypothetical decreases in attrition may also have a
leveraging effect that becomes more pronounced with time. Since part of the annual
recruiting goal is driven by unplanned losses resulting from early attrition, reductions in
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attrition should serve to drive down these goals, resulting in eventual cost-savings that
may not be evident at first. Additionally, the need to recruit fewer people each year
implies that recruiters can then be even more selective—further leveraging the initial
retention gains attributable to RJPs. These gains could rapidly offset the anticipated
initial rise in recruiting costs caused by increases in the (yet unknown) contact-to-contract
ratio—increases that might be expected as a result of presumed decreases in the rate of
job acceptance. If Premack and Wanous (1985) are correct in concluding that their
observations, though modest, are consistent, then the continual effects of improved
retention for first-term enlistees, taken together with more selective recruiting, should
rapidly reach a steady-state condition that closely approximates some unknown (but
probably lower) "natural" rate of attrition.
If this potential leveraging effect holds true, then the Navy's personnel processes
would require major changes to reflect the higher survival rates. As an example, the
promotion and pay systems might require changes to reflect the decreased upward-
mobility implied by people staying in the personnel system for longer periods of time.
There is a definite risk that, at some point, the rank structure could become bloated with
people unable to move up because of higher retention (lower attrition) rates at the upper
levels. Future research should include estimates of the degree to which changes in
attrition rates affect personnel inventories and their related systems. The Navy already
uses manpower models that could provide such estimates. If modeling indicated
intensified competition for promotions at the lower pay levels, new compensation plans
that were responsive to these diminished advancement opportunities would be needed. It
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is likely that developing these alternative compensation plans may represent one of the
highest costs, since changes to the promotion and pay systems of the military are subject
to influence on many levels. In addition to the many civilian and military personnel
professionals involved, any changes would need to be approved and funded via
Congressional action—after being scrutinized by a legion of special-interest groups and
Senate and House staffs and sub-committees. The incidental person-hour costs
associated with this activity are, by themselves, staggering.
Equally difficult to quantify is the risk that organizations may become stagnant in
their thinking without the fresh insights that new recruits bring with them upon entry.
Simply put, the greater in quantity and diversity the entering workforce, the more likely
that an organization will confront opportunities to change. Suppose that the net effect of
RJPs is to attract a smaller number of recruits who exhibit a definite preference for the
peculiarities of Naval service as perceived at the time of enlistment. This condition could
actually have a negative effect on the service over time. To illustrate, when an enlistee
leaves the Navy before completing the first-term, it is both a problem and an opportunity.
The problem is obvious—a replacement must be found and the cost of training
duplicated. The opportunity is less obvious—the reason the recruit became dissatisfied
and left may identify problems within the organization that need attention. If the source
of dissatisfaction can be identified and corrected, then the Navy can improve its working
conditions for all who remain. Many Navy quality-of-life initiatives have been driven by
complaints and problems as well as by the comments of departing servicemembers. In
this sense then, attrition is "good" for an organization since it serves as an indicator or
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warning sign. RJPs, by attracting people to the Navy who may be willing to tolerate
some dissatisfaction in exchange for the overall desirability of the job, may, in fact, slow
the pace of improvement in working conditions within its ranks. This could make it
ultimately more difficult to recruit in the future, if improvements in working conditions
for society-at-large outpace those within the Navy. In this sense, RJPs have a difficult-to-
quantify, but nonetheless potentially high, cost associated with their use.
Finally, a potential source of long-term savings lies in overhead, as the training
support infrastructure could be reduced to reflect the lower requirement for training
replacements. As GAO (1997) notes, though, the requirement to maintain a training base
adequate to support increased training requirements in times of national emergency limits
the total savings available in this area. These are but a few illustrative examples of new
problems that could be encountered by reducing turnover using RJPs—there are
doubtless others. It is important to consider the cause-and-effect relationships that would
be affected, some profoundly, by introducing such sweeping change into a relatively
stable system.
D. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that the increasing emphasis on recruiting high school
graduates, the search for computer-literate enlistees by advertising on the Internet, and
the targeting of college campuses for enlistees who may be contemplating a break from
their academic pursuits, represent a gradually increasing sophistication of the enlisted
force. Yet, the recruitment and initial training processes are, in may ways, unchanged
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from their draft-era origins. As Binkin and Eitelberg (1982), cited in Eitelberg et al.
(1984), note:
Whether the standards used for enlistment, job classification, and
assignment are as valid as adherence to them implies is an open question.
While in many cases present standards are based on years of experience
and are the products of extensive and rigorous research, in others they
appear to be nothing more than legacies of the conscription era when there
was virtually no pressure on the armed forces to justify their manning
criteria.
The basic training process appears to be one such legacy. Insofar as many
draftees may have required the sharp wake-up call to military service that boot camp
provides, that radical transformation process may have outlived its usefulness. Today's
recruits are better educated and more sophisticated than their conscripted predecessors.
Higher levels of sophistication probably imply higher individual expectations. Their
decision to serve has been considered in light of many competing alternatives, including
continued education—an option that DoD advertises as a benefit of enlistment. The
qualitative benefits of our current accession and training processes must be viewed in
light of this increasing sophistication of the youth-eligible recruiting market.
At least four emergent Navy policies combine to make the concept of providing
RJPs more appealing in late 1990s. The first is the renewed emphasis on the Navy's core
values of honor, courage, and commitment. Clearly, having the moral courage to tell
prospective applicants, in all honesty, about both the negative and positive aspects of
their future job is in keeping with the spirit of these values. The current military hiring
model, which features the use of recruiters as "salespeople," may present somewhat of a
moral dilemma with regard to the Navy's core values. Any blame does not, however, lie
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with the recruiters, but rather with the incentive and screening systems under which
recruiters operate. Recruiters are rewarded for putting as many "qualified" people in the
military as they are able—there is no incentive for screening out people who may not
demonstrate the personal characteristics that, in the opinion of the recruiter, are
associated with success. This is strictly an outcome of the quota-driven system, and it
usually results in recruiters fulfilling more of a role of salesperson than that of a human-
resources professional representing a multi-billion dollar global organization.
Next, is the increasing emphasis on bringing business-based practices such as
process improvement and team skills into the day-to-day operations of the Navy. With
regard to reciprocity in evaluating the job match, recruiting into this environment should
include screening for the ability to work in groups, and demonstrate problem-solving and
conflict resolution skills in a team environment. These behaviors could be modeled in
the RJP construct, providing yet another relevant measure of the person-job match.
Third, reducing attrition is a cornerstone of the Navy's stated personnel policy of
"maturing the force." This policy relies less on the lower marginal contributions ofnew
accessions and more on the increased productivity inherent in careerists. This increased
productivity is further leveraged by the fact that less time would be required to supervise
trainees. Such a policy would be better supported if mid-grade personnel who are to
make up the force are motivated to stay not only by increased economic incentives, but
also by increased job satisfaction as a result of a mutually beneficial person-job match.
Finally, the development of RJPs targeted toward specific Navy ratings would
require an evaluation and inventory of all jobs. Of particular interest here would be jobs
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that have the most objectionable characteristics. This forces the issue of whether or not
these jobs could be re-engineered, or environmentally improved, such that they are less
objectionable, and less likely to have lower acceptance rates. This suggests an obvious
tie-in with the Navy's "Smart Ship" initiative, which serves to reduce crew sizes by
removing unnecessary processes and "taking work off of the sailor's back." Smaller
crew sizes are clearly more effective when people are matched properly to jobs, and
when those jobs do not entail needless or noxious tasks.
In closing, most of the recommendations offered here could be implemented on a
relatively small-scale to estimate their effectiveness. Of primary interest are the cost
considerations of RJP development and implementation, and the recruiting costs
associated with reduced rates ofjob acceptance. The benefits of reduced turnover are
more well-known, and include reduced training costs and, ultimately, reduced recruiting
costs. In the end though, the best argument for incorporating RJPs may defy quantitative
justification. Telling the whole truth to potential enlistees is a moral imperative—the
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